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1. ‘Europeanisation’ of Industrial Relations: A Conceptual 
Framework of Reference 
 
 
Industrial relations regulations and practices are under a process of 
intense re-regulation in all over the world of the world. The changes that 
are taking place are so radical that they lead to a rethinking and, 
sometimes, an identity crisis for the national systems of labour law and 
industrial relations, historically based on states. As rightly pointed out by 
Roger Blanpain ‘rules, practices and expectations of yesterday are less 
and less relevant for tackling the problems of today and tomorrow in the 
new world of work. In a sense, we need to start from scractch’ (R. 
Blanpain, 1999a, 41). 
 
Within the European Union this trend is not simply induced by the process 
of transposition of social directives – mostly in the implementation of 
social parties’ agreements – although their role must not be 
underestimated especially when this process lead to an unpredictable 
shift in a domestic system of industrial relations. In this respect, the Italian 
case appears particularly problematic with reference to the heavy 
consequences of the process of transposition of the EU Directive n. 
1999/70/CE on fixed-term contracts on the dynamic of the Italian system 
of industrial relations and more specifically on the relationship among the 
three main trade union confederations (see infra, § 2.4.). 
 
Nor may everything be explained simply in terms of the ‘globalisation 
effect’ which forces corporations and trade unions to change attitude 
and to adopt comparable strategies, but is not equally effective in 
influencing the action of Governments and social parties (see: M. Biagi 
2000c, 155 et seqq.). In this respect, already in the 1960’s a group of 
prominent scholars had addressed the issue of the unavoidable 
convergence of the main features of industrialized countries under the 
pressure of internationalization, including their national industrial relations 
systems. (C. Kerr et al., 1960). A sobering prospect came to temper the 
conclusions reached some fifteen years later and rephrased them under 
statements of a more generalized nature (J. T. Dunlop, et al., 1975). 
 
A profound change in the European systems of industrial relations is also 
under way due to the impact of the Amsterdam Treaty’s Employment 
Chapter. By including ‘employment’ in the Community policies, and thus 
making the promotion of employment opportunities a matter of 
common concern, the Amsterdam Treaty ensures the development of 
employment initiatives and the creation of a consistent policy at the 
European level. The extraordinary European Council meeting on 
Employment in Luxembourg in November 1997 gave life to these 
provisions by developing an agreed-upon coordinated process for 
implementation – the so called ‘open method of coordination’ (in the 
literature see recently, among the others, P. Ahonen, 2001). As well 
known, the culmination of these efforts was the adoption of the 
‘Luxembourg Process on Employment Guidelines and National Action 
Plans,’ which endorses a coordinated strategy at the EU level – the 
‘European Employment Strategy’ (EES) – aimed at the development of 
active job creation policies (see J. Goetschy, 1999, 122 et seqq.). 
 
As a matter of fact the main source of inspiration of the ‘open method of 
coordination’ was that of the Luxemburg process regarding the European 
Employment Strategy. However; it represents a new concept introduced by for 
the first time by the Lisbon European Council of 23-24 march 2000 – after a 
reflection on governance tools – in order to better implement the long-term 
strategy for a competitive knowledge-based economy with more and better 
employment and social cohesion M.J. Rodrigues, 2001). It aims to organise a 
learning process about how to cope with the common challenges of the global 
economy in a co-ordinated way while also respecting national diversity. The 
Presidency conclusions of Lisbon Summit 
(http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/index.htm) formally adopted this 
method in the following terms: 
 
§ 37 – ‘Implementation of the strategic goal will be facilitated by applying a new 
open method of coordination as the means of spreading best practices and 
achieving grater convergence towards the main EU goals. This method, which is 
designed to help Member States to progressively developing their own policies, 
involves: 
 
• Fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific timetables for 
achieving the goals which they set in the short, medium and long terms; 
• Establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators 
and benchmarks against the best in the world and tailored to the needs 
of different Member States and sectors as a means of comparing best 
practices; 
• Translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies 
by setting specific targets and adopting measures, taking into account 
national and regional differences; 
• Periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as mutual 
learning processes 
 
The purpose of the open method of coordination is not to define a general 
ranking of member States in each policy but rather to organise a learning 
process at European level in order to stimulate exchange and the emulation of 
best practices and in order to help member States to improve their own national 
policies. As recently pointed out in the White Paper of the European Commission 
on ‘European Governance’ (2001, 21) Community action may be 
complemented or reinforced, on a case by case basis, by the use of ‘open 
method of coordination’. This method is a tool for encourage co-operation, the 
exchange of best practices and agreeing common targets and guidelines for 
Member States. It relies ‘on regular monitoring of progress to meet those targets, 
allowing Member States to compare their efforts and learn from the experience 
of others’. 
 
The Amsterdam Treaty is certainly based on the idea of respecting 
national prerogatives and competences in the area of labour law and 
industrial relations. It however provides at the same time a full-fledged 
legitimacy of Community action in employment matters. While 
respecting the diversity of domestic industrial relations systems and 
labour market regulations, Member States are under the obligation to 
act within the constraints of parameters jointly agreed upon each year. 
In other words, the Amsterdam Employment Chapter and its 
implementation, the Luxembourg Process, represent the 
constitutionalisation of a Community action in this field. 
 
In the scientific literature there is a increasing agreement on the fact that the 
application of the Luxembourg exercise is leading to a certain degree of 
convergence of Member States’ systems of industrial relations. This convergence 
is not dictated by EC institutions and rules, but instead based on a growing 
consensus on effective solutions through a process of trial and error (in this 
perspective see, for instance, H. Borstlap, 1999, 365 et seqq.). Some guidelines 
(mainly 1, 2 and 3 in the 1998-2001 experience) may be considered as examples 
of ‘convergence criteria’ in employment affairs. Nevertheless, differently from 
the convergence criteria laid down by the Maastricht Treaty for the monetary 
union, the criteria identified by the employment guidelines flow from soft law and 
are not written in the Treaty (J. Kenner, 1999, 33 et seqq.; D. Meulders, et al, 1997, 
15 et seqq.). The provisions of the last decade, typically made by hard-laws and 
collective bargaining have been replaced with formulae of a flexible nature that 
are really a statement of objectives rather than prescriptive rules of behaviour. 
The EES represented the move from management by regulation to management 
by objectives, a new way of working not simply for the EU authorities but mainly 
for national Governments (A. Larsson, 1999; T. Treu, 2001b, 93). 
 
Anyhow, while any convergence imposed by the EU authorities should be 
considered as inappropriate, one cannot prevent the Luxembourg process to 
achieve some results in the same direction due to a fruitful exchange of best 
practices (learning from each other’s positive experience) and, more in general, 
because of the influence exercised by various activities such as benchmarking 
(comparison of each other’s national plans and, especially, performance) and 
peer pressure (diplomatically tackling Member States that are not sufficiently 
active (in this perspective see: M. Biagi, 1998, 325 ss.).  
 
All these factors raise some fundamental questions. Are we facing a 
trend towards the Europeanisation of industrial relations? Is it proper to 
speak of a European model? What is the impact of the monetary union 
in this respect? How is labour law reacting?  
 
In a recent symposium dedicated to the discussion of the first Report of 
the European Commission on Industrial Relations – organised by the 
Italian Industrial Relations Research Association in collaboration with the 
European Commission and the Centre of International & Comparative 
Studies in Labour Law & Industrial Relations University of Modena & 
Reggio Emilia (held on the 1 & 2 December 2000 in Modena – Italy) – a 
high level group of international experts have tried to provide an answer 
to these questions. The conclusions have been articulated and 
diversified (see the contributions collected in M. Biagi, 2001a). On one 
point however the agreement was quite unanimous: a European model 
of industrial relations in proper terms is not yet forthcoming. The 
increasing progress in the social area (from the Treaty of Rome of 1957 to 
the Treaties of Amsterdam of 1997 and of Nice of 2000) fall short of 
establishing international industrial relations. Indeed, there is neither a 
European Industrial Relations system, nor one in the making, at least for 
the present. ‘As things stand, this is probably valid for a long time and for 
the foreseeable future’ (in this sense see, among the others, J. Rojot, 
2001, 79). 
 
The institutions of industrial relations still differ greatly between European 
countries, and these differences will certainly increase as the Union 
enlarges. We deal with very different cultures and institutions among 
countries belonging to the European Union and these differences deeply 
influence national, individual, and, collective perceptions, attitudes, 
practices and behaviours. ‘The traditional institutional paths that orient 
national experiences of industrial relations have undergone significant 
change but they have nevertheless resisted these pressures’ (see G.P. 
Cella, 2001, 40).  
 
The present national systems of industrial relations ‘are the outcome of a 
long and separate historical evolution, each shaped by a unique set of 
social, economic and political developments. Union structures are 
affected by these developments, as well as the ones of the employers 
associations’ (J. Rojot, 2001, 73). In this respect it is not surprising that 
different domestic/national systems still retain their own features, while 
the influence of central European institutions – i.e. EU Commission, 
Council and social organizations of interest – tends to diminish 
progressively especially in the areas where the main decisions are 
determined at decentralized levels (T. Kauppinen, 2001, 49 ss). The 
conclusion is that the primary responsibility for the development of 
industrial relations ‘rests on national and local actors – which even for the 
most convinced Europeanists corresponds to a proper meaning of 
subsidiarity’ (T. Treu, 2001a). In this respect, European institutions can only 
set ‘a favourable context capable of influencing this process – through 
the multi-faced procedures of soft law’ (ibidem).   
 
If this is the general framework of reference, what sense does it make to 
talk of ‘Europeanisation’ of industrial relations? The Commission’s First 
Report on Industrial Relations contains an attempt to answer this 
question. Two main interpretative guidelines influence the entire 
Commission’s Report. On the one hand it is still evident the persistence of 
marked national dynamics in the government and development of the 
different system of industrial relations. ‘Practices governing the 
framework of dialogue, the outcome of collective bargaining, the 
conditions for collective action and the arrangements for resolving 
conflicts are, however, still determined at national level. European law is 
not applicable to such matters, which are determined by strong national 
traditions’ (European Commission, 2000c, 6). On the other hand, 
however, it is possible to identify an increasing convergence on 
European issues. ‘The firmly rooted national element of industrial relations 
has assumed a wider dimension as a result of growing Europe-wide 
cooperation in the economic, monetary and employment spheres, 
giving rise to innovative, flexible forms of interaction’ (European 
Commission, 2000c, 2). In this respect we can say that European industrial 
relations are changing and they change in a perspective of increasingly  
‘Europeanisation.’ 
 
As rightly pointed out by Gian Primo Cella ‘the contradiction between 
the two judgements is only apparent: each of them singles out both 
ongoing trends and possible future developments in European industrial 
relations (G.P. Cella, 2001, 44). 
 
Perhaps the most marked differences that emerge from analysis of 
national cases concern the representativeness of actors and the styles of 
trade-union representation. Rates of unionisation and coverage of 
existing agreements still differ greatly among countries. Equally marked 
differences are present in the representation of employers. (European 
Commission, 2000c,  9-12. See also: Booth, et al., 2000, 12). However, the 
Commission’s First Report on Industrial Relations rightly emphasises some 
emerging common trends which support the view of a progressive 
‘Europeanisation’ of the different national systems of industrial relations. 
The examples recalled below (boxes 1-4) help us to synthesise the main 
results of a recent comparative analysis on the Commission’s Report in 
the perspective of ‘Europeanisation’ of industrial relations.  
 
For a deeper analysis of this point see, among the others, G.P. Cella, 2001, M. 
Biagi, 2000c, T. Kauppinen, 2001 which have founded some relevant elements of 
convergence in the evolution of national systems of industrial relations toward 
the perspective of Europeanisations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Box 1 – Participation v. Conflictual Industrial Relations 
 
 
I. At community level the climate between employers and their 
employees is more participatory and, in any case, much less conflictual 
than in the past. Strike action has drastically declined. 
 
     Figure 1-  Strikes in the European Union - Days 
 
 
millions 
 
 
 
Source: European Commission, 2000c,  
See also: ILO, Strikes and Lockouts by Industry (http://www-rcade.dur.ac.uk/dsets/27.html) 
 
 
 
    Box 2 – Social Pacts at European Employment Strategy 
 
 
II. European social parties play a more relevant role. They often engage 
in negotiations covering issues which do not coincide with the classic 
matters in the industrial relations field. In this way, management and 
labour are contributing to the so called ‘European employment 
strategy’. Undoubtedly the best example of ‘virtuous’ change in 
national institutional traditions of industrial relations – under the direct 
and indirect influence of EU policies – which goes in the direction of 
cooperative industrial relations, as outlined by article 138 of the Treaty 
of Amsterdam, is the return, unexpected by both scholars and 
practitioners (J.R. Grote et al., 1999, 34-63), in diverse national contexts 
of practices which belong to the general category of ‘social pacts’ 
(for employment, economic growth, financial restructuring, welfare 
reform, etc. See: M. Regini, 2001, 163-171 and  B. Caruso, 2001, 193-
225).  That this revival is surprising is aptly emphasized by the Report: 
‘Most Member States are moving towards tripartism, even those with 
non particular traditions in this field’ (European Commission, 2000c, 80). 
Excluded from this revival, or from any policy in this direction, are only 
two countries (apart from Austria, where tripartite concertation is 
strongly institutionalised), namely France and the UK: the former with its 
tradition of social actors with uncertain representativeness, weak 
bargaining, and the state as the sole repository of all ‘social 
knowledge’; the latter, despite some significant changes, still 
characterized by the more or less forced abandonment of any form of 
centralized bargaining. But one cannot rule out that these countries, 
too, may move towards collaboration-concertation of more or less 
explicitly tripartite form (G.P. Cella, 2001). At bottom, these 
cooperation pacts reveal that it is possible to achieve highly significant 
changes in trade-union action and the regulation of bargaining 
without depriving industrial relations of their most typical connotations: 
‘The new agreements mark the end of the demands of the past, the 
new spirit being one of wage restraint, increased labour market 
flexibility and social security reform, presupposing a change in attitude 
on the part of the trade unions’ (European Commission, 2000c, p. 85). 
 
 
 
Figure 2 - Social pacts in the Member States: the key stages in the 
1990s 
 
 
 
 
Source: European Commission, 2000c, p. 81 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 - Main differences between the agreements signed in 
the 1960s and those signed in the 1990s 
 
 
 
Source: European Commission, 2000c, 82 
 
 
 
Box 3 – Wage Restraint Policy, Wage Dispersion, Financial Participation 
practices 
 
 
III. All in all, the wage restraint policy has been consolidated. In a number 
of countries, deals at macro-level have strengthened the strategic 
option of the trade unions' commitment to abandon excessive pay 
demands. In return, the unions have been able to gain in terms of 
promoting pro-labour policies in various fields of action (taxation, 
housing, education, sanitary policies, etc.). Wage dispersion is smaller 
in Europe than in the United States and this may be a reason of the 
higher level of European unemployment among unskilled workers (R. 
Blanpain, 2001b, 129-147). One would expect that the greater 
inequality in the United States, combined with a less generous social 
safety net would lead to a higher unemployment rate. The Commission 
Report reminds us that the research done on this topic does not reach 
a definite conclusion and, consequently, flexibility in the form of a 
more unequal wage distribution may not be a panacea (see: C. 
Dell’Aringa, 2001, 147-157). Particularly relevant is the development of 
financial participation. Financial participation appears to make it 
possible for wages to be more flexible over the business cycle. If 
financial participation has been so successful in recent years, it is 
certainly because of the active role played by the social partners. In 
the Commission Report financial participation is mentioned in this 
Report not only as a tool of wage flexibility but also as an important 
element of human resources management for the purpose of 
improving employees motivation and commitment (see also: E. 
Poutsma, 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 -  Financial Participation Practices in Top European 
Companies  
 
 
 
Source: F. Van den Bulcke, 1999 
 
 
 
Box 4 – Collective Bargaining and Individualisation of Employment 
Relationship 
 
 
IV. Collective bargaining is still a vital phenomenon. Agreements in the 
area of wages and working time are certainly of great interest, since 
both employers and employees have found this topic really crucial in 
meeting their demands. However, the trend toward an 
individualisation of employment contracts is quite clear. In most 
European countries trade unions have experienced large declines in 
their membership in the last two decades (see: T. Boeri, 2001, 159).  
Often the decline in the organised presence of the unions has not 
been associated with a reduction of their influence over the 
determination of economic policies, notably in crucial areas for 
workers, such as pensions, unemployment insurance and employment 
protection regulations. Actually, in some countries, mainly those of 
Continental and Southern Europe, a diverging dynamics of 
membership rates (the proportion of the workforce being unionised) 
and coverage (the share of workers covered by collective 
agreements) was observed. 
 
Figure 5 - Union Density in Europe  
 
  Un io n De n s it y  i n  E u ro pe
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Sources: T. Boeri, 2001, 159 
 
 
 
Figure 6  - Union Density in Europe 
 
 
 
Sources: T. Boeri, 2001,  160 
 
 
In short, these are the main findings of the Commission’s First Report on 
Industrial Relations. The evaluation of the Commission may appear rather 
optimistic. This however judgement is at the same time far-reaching in 
that it is able to identify some traces, increasingly clear, of an ongoing 
process of ‘Europeanisation’. This seems confirmed, in particular, 
regarding the contents of collective bargaining (see on this point the 
comparative studies of the European Foundation of July 1999 on The 
‘Europeanisation’ of collective bargaining). 
 
Starting from this conceptual framework of reference on the main 
developments of the systems of industrial relations in Europe the 
fundamental scope of this paper is to put the European models of 
industrial relations into the global perspective. In this respect, the study 
will concentrate on developing quality criteria for well functioning 
European Industrial Relations and on benchmarking the quality of the 
European Industrial Relations to US, Japan and Eastern European 
Countries. 
 
As rightly pointed out by Tiziano Treu ‘a  decisive  testing ground for 
industrial relations will be their capacity to handle new qualitative issues 
having to do with both the quality of production, work, organization, 
quality of jobs, training etc. and the quality of life (in and outside  
workplaces)’ (T. Treu, 2001a). This is an immense challenging  area for 
social Europe and industrial relations which the Council and Commission 
have recently asked the social parties  to explore (see infra, § 4),  with  
collaborative initiatives to be monitored through appropriate indicators.  
 
Of course, this new area requires further adaptation of all traditional 
forms  of regulation both of labour law – i.e. less mandatory rules, more 
soft law - and collective bargaining - framework agreements or soft 
deals instead of quasi-legislative collective contract.  It requires also a 
higher degree of workers involvement as one of the main factors which 
might determine the quality of industrial relations system. In this 
perspective workers’ participation has to become less institutionalised 
and more result oriented (see the contributions collected in M. Biagi, 
2002).  
 
2 Quality in Community Industrial Relations: an    
Institutional Viewpoint 
 
  
2.1. The ‘Quality Factor’ and the European Social Model: from Lisbon to 
Laeken 
 
The importance of the ‘Quality factor’ in Community Industrial Relations 
was stressed for the first time at Lisbon in March 2000 
(http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/index.htm).  
 
Of course quality issues in working life are not new. During the seventies and the 
eighties, for instance, quality was not taken as productivity an employment 
factor but as an ethical factor based on safety and health policy (in the 
literature see the papers collected in M. Biagi, 1991). During the eighties and the 
nineties strong emphasis was placed on the contraposition between good jobs 
and bad jobs, especially in light of dual labour market theories (see, for a 
comparative perspective see the papers collected in B. Veneziani, 1992). But 
only from the beginning of 2000 that the ‘Quality factor’ was clearly indicated by 
EU authorities as a key element in the process of modernisation of the European 
Social model.  
 
Quite different is the situation in the U.S. In fact, job quality has been a central 
theme in North American literature about work since the 1960s. But from the mid-
1970s well into the 1980s, with a pair of fierce recessions in Canada and the 
United States and a debt- triggering economic crisis in Mexico, unemployment 
eclipsed job quality as an issue. At the beginning of nineties, with U.S. 
employment at its lowest in more than thirty years and Mexican unemployment 
lingering just above  twenty percent, analysts in both countries have  started to 
question the quality of available jobs (see, among the others: R.B. Freeman, 1994; 
C. Tilly, 1997, 269-274; C. Salas, 2000, 119-134; G.S. Lowe, 2000). 
 
The Lisbon European Council on 23 and 24 March 2000 set as a new 
strategic goal for the EU in the 2000-2010 decade ‘to become the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world 
capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and 
greater social cohesion’. The attainment of this strategic goal will enable 
the EU to regain the conditions for full employment. In this respect, quality 
was clearly indicated as a ‘driving force’ for a thriving economy, more 
and better jobs and an inclusive society ( M. Sahlin, 2001, 2). The rise of 
employment and the improvement of the quality of jobs are, in this 
perspective, the different faces of the same coin. In this respect the 
European Council of Lisbon established a coordinated strategy that 
entails  setting intermediate targets: the raising of the total employment 
rate as close as possible to 70 per cent and the employment rate of 
women to more than 60 per cent by 2010. Modernising the European 
social model and investing in people is one of the central aspects of 
achieving the overall Lisbon economic and social goals. 
 
It is true that the Treaty of the European Union reflects the deep 
interconnectedness between the economic and social dimensions of Europe. 
Article 2 of the Treaty states that the Community shall promote ‘a high level of 
employment and social protection, the raising of the standard of living and 
quality of life, and economic and social cohesion’. It is not surprising that before 
the Lisbon Council some scholars suggested utilising the concept of ‘social 
quality’ as a tool to measure the extent to which the daily lives of citizens have 
attained an unacceptable living conditions by European standards and the 
direction in which any changes are heading, i.e. as an alternative goal and 
yardstick by which to measure economic and social progress (W. Beck, et al., 
1997, 267). 
 
Until the Treaty of Amsterdam, however, scholars have unanimously developed a 
rather pessimistic approach to the social dimension of the European Union. For 
instance in a work expressly dedicated to the ‘Social Quality of Europe’ (D. 
Meulders et al., 1997, 15 et seqq.), were critical of the bias of European policy 
making towards monetary issues of the Maastrich Treaty and the absence of a 
serious debate about unemployment and the quality of social security. Given 
the Maastricht criteria and the strict stability pact regulation of the EMU, the 
national governments have minimal or no opportunities to follow a national 
monetary policy to temporarily release  economic restrictions and guarantee 
social security budgets. Similar pictures are, among  others,  (D. Bouget, 1997, 35 
et seqq., B. Shulte, 45 et seqq., D. Pieters, 1997, 69 et seqq., and B. Shulte, 1995, 
120 et seqq.). A pessimistic approach is still present, also after the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, in R. Blanpain, 1999a, 7). For this scholar ‘it is striking that such great 
asymmetry exists between, on the one hand, a global market economy in the 
form of an iron clad monetary agreement within the framework of the EMU, and 
social policies on the other hand, the ‘core’ issues of employment and wage 
costs remains essentially national. There is no appropriate balance’. 
 
In this perspective - as rightly pointed out by L. Cocilovo (2001,1) the most 
important statement to come out of the Lisbon Council ‘concerned the need to 
establish synergies and interdependency between economic policies, 
employment policies and social policies. This undertaking (…) is based on the 
conviction that this virtuous triangle will also increase the effectiveness of specific 
sectoral policies and the processes underlying them. It is easier in this context to 
understand the reference to quality objectives which must be adopted, in 
addition to purely quantitative parameters’. 
 
The Nice European Council on 7, 8 and 9 December 2000 has reinforced 
the political mandate of the Lisbon Summit (Presidency conclusions 
(http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/index.htm). The ‘Quality Factor’ 
was put at the heart of the «European Social Agenda» for the next years 
as a key element in promoting employment in a competitive and 
inclusive knowledge economy (A. Diamantopoulou, 2001, 2-11). The Nice 
council Conclusions stated, in particular, that  ‘the Social Policy Agenda 
must… place the emphasis on the promotion of quality in all areas of 
social policy. Quality of training, quality in work, quality of industrial 
relations and quality of social policy…’ (M.J. Rodrigues, 2001).  The Nice 
European Council conclusions called for more focus on ‘attaining quality 
in work and its importance for growth as a significant attractive factor 
and an incentive to work. A Commission Communication will refer in 2001 
to the contribution of employment policy to the quality  of work (in 
particular as regards working conditions, health and safety, 
remuneration, gender equality, balance between flexibility and job 
security, and social relations)’. (EMCO/25/090701/EN, 1).  
 
After Nice ‘quality’ has thus become a “common theme’ of the social agenda, 
linking together the various dimensions of the Lisbon strategy: ‘making Europe 
the most competitive knowledge-based economy in the world that is capable, 
at the same time, of achieving full employment, preserving its strong social 
cohesion and modernising its social protection system. The “quality” dimension 
should thus become the prism through which, or the benchmark by which, 
policies will have to be evaluated and devised in all these areas’ (O. Quintin, 
2001, 2). Of course the search for ‘job quality’ reflects the political input to avoid 
a dual labour market: insiders (well-paid and stable workers) on  the one hand, 
and outsiders (low-paid and precarious workers) on the other one. Starting from 
the classical study from P. Doeringer, M. Piore, 1971, the literature on this point is 
immense. (See, among the others, P. Ichino, 1996; A.B. Schaik, H.L.F. van de 
Groot, 1995; European Foundation, 2001). 
 
At the informal meeting by the Council of Ministers for gender equality and 
Ministers for Social Affairs in Norrköping discussed questions relevant to the issue 
of quality in social policy. The focus was on tax structure, benefits and social 
security systems from a gender perspective in order to contribute at reconciling 
work and family life. The  quality of work was also discussed at the informal ESP-
Council meeting in Luleå in February 2001. In this circumstance emphasis was put 
on life long learning for all, gender equality, work environment, labour law, 
worker participation, work organisation and diversity in working life (M. Sahlin, 
2001, 2-3). 
 
‘Re-gaining full employment not only involves focusing on more jobs, but 
also on better jobs (…) including equal opportunities for the disabled, 
gender equality, good and flexible labour contracts permitting a better 
reconciliation of work and personal life, lifelong learning, health and 
safety at work, employee involvement and diversity in work life’. In this 
perspective the Stockholm European Council on 23 and 24 March 2001 
has invited Governments as well as the Council to ‘define common 
approaches to maintaining and improving the quality of work which 
should be included as a general objective in the 2002 employment 
guidelines’ (Presidency conclusions: 
http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/index.htm). The Stockholm 
European Council requested also that the Council together with the 
Commission develop indicators on quality in work, to be presented in 
time for the Laeken European Council in December 2001 (Presidency 
conclusions: http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/index.htm).  
 
Following these suggestions the Commission has adopted a 
Communication on quality which includes a section on possible 
dimensions of quality in work and proposes possible indicators under 
those dimensions (see European Commission, 2001c). By promoting 
higher quality objectives, and by investing in better quality policies, the 
Commission ‘aims to encourage and assist the Member States in 
improving the pace at which the quality of life is improved within the 
Union, inside and outside of work, and provide appropriate aspirations 
for candidate countries’ (ibidem, 4). The Communication is divided in 
three main parts: 
 
- An analysis of the components of the European social model and the deep 
relationship between quality of work and the modernisation of the European 
social model. In this part the Commission recognises that social policy is not 
simply an outcome of good economic performance and policies but are at the 
same time ‘an input and a framework’. In this context ‘the modernisation of the 
social model means developing and adapting it to take account of the rapidly 
changing new economy and society, and to ensure the positive mutually 
supportive role of economic and social policies’ (ibidem, 5). 
 
- Secondly it considers how to define quality and how to develop indicators of 
quality. In this perspective the Commission recognises that ‘there is no standard 
or agreed definition of quality in work in the academic and expert literature’ 
(ibidem, 7). Given the lack of a single composite measure, in fact, most 
research suggest various key dimensions of job quality, which include a focus on 
both the specific characteristics of the job (e.g. pay, hours of work, skill 
requirements, job content, etc.) and on aspects of the whole work environment 
(health and safety at work, health insurance coverage, working conditions, 
career prospects, training, etc.). In the literature see, among the others, J. Clark 
(1998). On this point, in order to provide a framework for the analysis of  work 
quality, the Commission suggests two broad dimensions partially different from 
those elaborated by  scholars: 1) Objective and intrinsic characteristic of the job 
(including: job satisfaction, remuneration, non-pay rewards, working time, skills 
and training prospects for career advancement, job content, match between 
jobs characteristics and worker characteristics); 2) the work and wider labour 
market context (gender equality, health and safety, flexibility and security, 
access to jobs, work-life balance, social dialogue and worker involvement, 
diversity and non discrimination) (ibidem, 8). The Commission therefore proposes 
an analytical and detailed set of indicators covering ten main elements of 
quality within the two broad dimensions – the characteristics of the job itself and 
the job within the context of the labour market (ibidem, 22-26).   
 
- Finally the communication looks at applying these definitions and indicators of 
quality through a process of quality reviews. In this context the Commission 
states that quality goals, instruments and indicators are already, ‘to some extent 
and in various ways’ incorporated in the European Employment Strategy. For 
the Commission this is most notable in relations to the employment guidelines: 
promoting employability of individuals (pillar 1 of the guidelines) is about 
improving the prospects of finding a job and upgrading skills, while promoting 
adaptability (pillar 3) focuses on the modernisation of work organisation through 
a process of dialogue between social partners and the government. Moreover 
the promotion of equal opportunities had been one of the key dimension (pillar 
4) from the start of the Luxemburg process (ibidem, 14). 
 
 
2.2. The European Employment Strategy, the ‘Quality Factor’ and the 
Development of Industrial Relations in Europe: an Institutional Assessment 
 
Ass   alll rr eady  poiiintt ed  outt   iiin  tt he  lll iii tt err att urr e  (( M..   Biiiagiii ,,   2001a,,   3-- 15)) ,,   tt he  
Commiiiss ss iiion  rr ecogniiiss ess   tt hatt   ‘‘ ss tt rr engtt heniiing  tt he  qualll iii tt y  diiimenss iiion  doess   
nott   iiimpllly  any  new  prr ocess ss ess ,,   orr   even  a  rr adiiicalll llly  new  apprr oach  tt o  
polll iiicy  att   Eurr opean  lllevelll’’   (( Eurr opean  Commiiiss ss iiion,,   2001c,,   14)) ..   Whatt   iii tt   
doess   rr equiii rr e,,   morr e  ss iiimpllly,,   iii ss   ‘‘ a  brr oaderr ,,   and  deeperr ,,   polll iiicy  
develllopmentt   encompass ss iiing  nott   onllly  tt he  eff ff ectt iiiveness ss   off   iiindiiiviiidualll   
polll iiicy  iiinss tt rr umentt ss   iiin  achiiieviiing  tt heiii rr   goalllss ,,   butt   tt he  coherr ence,,   iiin  each  
polll iiicy  arr ea,,   bett ween  polll iiicy  goalllss ,,   tt he  iiinss tt rr umentt ss   tt hatt   arr e  avaiii lllabllle,,   
and  tt he  iiindiiicatt orr ss   uss ed  tt o  jjjudge  ss uccess ss   iiin  achiiieviiing  tt he  overr alll lll   polll iiicy  
objjjectt iiivess ’’   (( iiibiiidem,,   14)) ..   TT hiiiss   exx plllaiiinss   why  tt he  SS tt ockk holllm  Eurr opean  
Counciii lll   on  23  and  24  Marr ch  2001enphass iiiss ed  tt he  maiiintt enance  and  
iiimprr ovementt   off   tt he  qualll iii tt y  off   worr kk   ass   a  generr alll   aiiim  iiin  tt he  2002  
empllloymentt   guiiidelll iiiness ..   Accorr diiing  tt o  tt he  Commiiiss ss iiion  ‘‘ tt hiii ss   apprr oach,,   
encompass ss iiing  qualll iii tt y  goalllss ,,   iiinss tt rr umentt ss   and  iiindiiicatt orr ss ,,   prr oviiidess   a  
generr alll   meanss   off   purr ss uiiing  tt he  centt rr alll   ff ocuss   off   tt he  SS ociiialll   Polll iiicy  Agenda  
on  qualll iii tt y  iiin  alll lll   arr eass   off   empllloymentt   and  ss ociiialll   polll iiicy’’   (( Eurr opean  
Commiiiss ss iiion,,   2001c,,   15)) ..   
  
The impact of the European Employment Strategy (hereinafter simply 
referred to as the EES) has been visible also in labour law and industrial 
relations although mainly from a methodological point of view (see the 
papers collected in M. Biagi, 2001a). For the first time, the ‘open process 
of coordination’ has been applied also to matters which are heavily 
regulated through the bargaining activity of social parties, rather than 
via Government intervention (M. Biagi, 2001a) .  
 
In the literature there is large consensus on the fact that the Employment 
Guidelines (hereinafter simply EGLs) represent a highly innovative 
example of ‘convergence criteria’, although not explicitly provided by 
the Treaty, as in monetary affairs. According F. Vandenbroucke (2001), 
for instance the Luxembourg process ‘constitutes a strong and 
convincing precedent for the Open Method of Coordination in the area 
of employment policy. Contrary to what sceptics might have feared 
when it started in 1997, the discussion of the National Action Plans on 
Employment and the elaboration of European Guidelines for 
Employment Policies turned out to be a substantive exercise, in which 
not only the quantity, but also the quality of employment is taking an 
increasingly important place’.   
 
It is true that in the literature there are also some critical views on ‘open method 
of coordination’. If employers are maintaining that the Commission is exceeding 
its mandate with the OPC and trade unions are critical for limiting their 
manoeuvre power, according Luc Tholoniat, (2000) the administrative dimension 
of the European strategy of employment reveals the weakness of its results. The 
administration constitutes both the place of production and that of the 
implementation of decisions. The confrontation both of the proposals and of the 
results at European level leads to grater coordination of national administrations, 
which thus develop closer relations at European level. The new administrative 
configuration which starts to emerge is probably not safe from the danger of 
bureaucratic routine. The effects of European employment strategy as regards 
to reducing unemployment would seem, however, to be much less identifiable. 
The ‘open method of coordination’ seems to have difficulty in getting beyond 
the stage of words and managing through its results, to mobilise anything other 
than the administration. 
 
In this introduction to the last report by the Belgian Ministry of Employment and 
Labour, the Secretary-General Michel Jadot, is even more critical in his appraisal. 
According to his analysis the ‘open method of coordination’ has led to national 
policies’ being framed in the name of employment. The injunction of the ‘all to 
employment’ involves an approach to social regulations that is simply not shared 
by the majority of those involved in the labour market. The result is accordingly 
‘to put systematically on trial collective bargaining in Belgium or our way of 
building a base of advantages for the benefit of those which cannot have 
access to normal work’ (Federal Ministry of Employment and Labour, 2000, 19). 
 
As pointed out by M. Alauf (2001) contrary to the wishes of Commissioner 
Diamantopoulou the convergence initiated by the open method of 
coordination is not always therefore done in accordance with systems and 
traditions an even less “in cooperation with all involved (Diamantopulou, 2001a). 
Certainly if the recent practice of the ‘open method cooperation’ reveals its 
defects, it is not sufficient to disqualify it. It derives its legitimacy from the fact that 
it represents the process most capable of progressing in European integration 
taking account both of the present institutional structures and of the 
enlargement prospects. Until we manage to rebalance European integration 
around the social, institutional process such the ‘open method of coordination’, 
however subtle and flexible, will probably be unable to mobilise anything other 
than administrations and even less to transform the European questions into real 
democratic issues (M. Alauf, 2001). 
 
The first years of implementation of the EES have seen the Commission 
interpreting the implementation of EGLs in a logic of convergence, 
rather than simply of coordination (see supra, § 1), with special reference 
to measurable EGLs under the Employability Pillar (see, in the literature: 
M. Biagi, 2000c, 155 et seqq.). For the first time, at least in labour matters, 
a soft-law mechanism has been applied on a Community-wide scale. 
Instead of long-awaited and watered down directives, there is an 
implicit assumption that open coordination methodology might 
contribute more effectively to innovation in labour law and industrial 
relations (M. Biagi, 2000c). 
 
From this point of view the 2001 EGLs reflect some important innovations, 
in terms of methodology, as compared with the three previous years. First 
of all the mandate of the Lisbon summit (“more and better jobs”: see § 
2.1’.) is no longer simply a political commitment but it has been explicitly 
made part of the soft-law mechanism. Secondly, EGL 14 openly speaks 
of ‘subjects to be covered’, which corresponds to the US-style notion (in 
part accepted by the French labour code) of ‘mandatory topics’ of 
bargaining. This view is confirmed by the subsequent duty, equally 
provided in EGL 14, for the social parties ‘to report annually’ on their 
efforts to modernize work organization. 
  
Industrial relations, at least as they are conceived in the context of the 
Employment Title of the Treaty, are increasingly supposed to play a new 
role at the Community level, shifting from employment protection 
towards employment promotion (see the contributions collected in M. 
Biagi, 2000c). The two profiles do not seem to be in contradiction; truly, 
they represent two sides of the same coin (M. Biagi, 2001c; M. Rodríguez-
Piñero Bravo-Ferrer et al., 2001, 11 et seqq. and V. Marleau, 2001, 21 et 
seqq.). Social parties have received a mandate under Pillar 3 
(adaptability) in order to cooperate in creating new jobs; hopefully 
employment of good quality. To what extent this mission has been 
successful, looking at the first years of the Luxembourg process, is highly 
debatable.  
  
To reinforce the above mentioned conclusion, the literature suggests to 
look carefully at the 2001 employment guidelines (M. Biagi, 2001b, 3-15). 
In the second case of GL 13 for 2001, we read that ‘the social partners 
are invited ... within the context of the Luxembourg Process to report 
annually on which aspects of the modernisation of the organisation of 
work have been covered by the negotiations as well as the status of their 
implementation and impact on employment and labour market 
functioning’. In other words, management and labour are now under 
the obligation to report to the Council and the Commission (in view of 
the ‘joint employment report’) on the outcome of their bargaining 
activity in terms of promoting employees’ adaptability. 
 
The monitoring role of the Commission should address directly this new 
perspective concerning the role of collective bargaining in the context 
of the EES. The 2001 employment guidelines confirm that ‘in order to 
promote the modernisation of work organisation and forms of work, a 
strong partnership should be developed at all appropriate levels 
(European, national, sectoral, local and enterprise levels). This means - 
according to GL 13 - that ‘the social partners are invited ... to negotiate 
and implement at all appropriate levels agreements to modernise the 
organisation of work, including flexible working arrangements, with the 
aim of making undertakings productive and competitive, achieving the 
required balance between flexibility and security, and increasing the 
quality of jobs. Subjects to be covered may, for example, include the 
introduction of new technologies, new forms of work and working time 
issues such as the expression of working time as an annual figure, the 
reduction of working hours, the reduction of overtime, the development 
of part-time work, access to career breaks, and associated job security 
issues’.  
 
Also GL 14 includes a mandate for the Member States to be carried out 
jointly with the social parties. ‘Member States will, where appropriate in 
partnership with the social partners or drawing upon agreements 
negotiated by the social partners, review the existing regulatory 
framework ... at the same time ... examine the possibility of incorporating 
into national law more flexible types of contract’. Furthermore, 
management and labour are invited to support adaptability in 
enterprises as a component of lifelong learning. GL 15 invites them ‘to 
conclude agreements, where appropriate, on lifelong learning to 
facilitate adaptability and innovation, particularly in the field of 
information and communication technologies. In this context, the 
conditions for giving every worker the opportunity to achieve information 
society literacy by 2003 should be established’. 
 
These matters may be considered now as mandatory topics of 
bargaining. Social parties in Europe must engage in negotiations 
addressing these issues, in the logic of modernisation and adaptability 
(M. Biagi, 2001b). The social parties at all levels have been invited to step 
up their action in support of the Luxembourg process. So far, however, 
results have been rather disappointing, at least in substantial terms.  
 
The 2000 Joint Employment Report rightly emphasises that ‘progress on 
the incorporation of more adaptable forms of contract into Member 
States’ labour law remains limited, with a great majority of Member 
States adopting only piecemeal or incremental reforms ... with the 
emphasis on a single or, at most, a handful of topics rather than overall 
reform of labour legislation’. The Council and the Commission also 
agreed that ‘contractual modernisation ... includes piecemeal review of 
regulatory provisions, e.g. temporary contracts, agency work, dismissals, 
etc. building up holistic reform of legislative and collective arrangements 
governing employment relations’ (European Commission, 2000b). 
 
More recently, the 2001 Joint Employment Report emphasises that ‘the 
horizontal objectives introduced in the 2001 Guidelines have not yet all 
been fully integrated into national employment strategies. Few Members 
States present a global approach as to how they intend to contribute to 
the attainment of the Lisbon and Stockholm employment targets and 
only those already closest to or above the European targets set national 
objectives in this respect’ (European Commission, 2000a). The objective 
of raising quality, in particular, ‘is taken up mainly in relation to labour 
supply, while quality in work is only considered in a limited way. Clear 
progress has been achieved in terms of developing lifelong learning, 
which is now an established policy priority throughout the European 
Union. Comprehensive lifelong learning strategies are now in place in 
about half of the Member States, but such strategies remain at an early 
stage of implementation. In addition, in the majority of Member States 
there is insufficient evidence of co-ordination and synergy between the 
competent Ministries. Also few Member States set targets for increases in 
human resource investment or participation in further learning’ (ibidem). 
 
As just said, the Stockholm European Council agreed that the Council 
should include quality in work as a general objective in the 2002 
Employment Guidelines. This is now reflected in the new horizontal 
objective B contained in the Commission Proposal for a Council Decision 
(European Commission, 2001a) on Guidelines for Member States' 
employment policies for the year 2002, which spells out the relevant 
aspects of quality in work on the basis of Commission Communication 
(European Commission, 2001c). In addition, new references to the quality 
aspect have been integrated in a number of relevant thematic 
guidelines: numbers 3, 4, 7, 10, 11 and 13. 
 
• GL 3: 1) developing a policy for active ageing. ‘In-depth changes in the 
prevailing social attitudes towards older workers, as well as a revision of 
tax-benefit systems are called for, in order to reach full employment, to 
help ensure the long-term fairness and sustainability of social security 
systems, and to make the best use of older workers' experience. The 
promotion of quality in work should also be considered as an important 
factor in maintaining older workers in the labour force’; 2) Developing 
skills for the new labour market in the context of Lifelong Learning. 
‘Effective and well functioning educational and training systems 
responsive to labour market needs are key to the development of the 
knowledge-based economy and to the improvement of the level and 
quality of employment. They are also crucial to the delivery of lifelong 
learning to allow for a smooth transition from school to work, lay the 
foundations for productive human resources equipped with core and 
specific skills and enable people to adapt positively to social and 
economic change. The development of an employable labour force 
involves providing people with the capacity to access and reap the 
benefits of the knowledge-based society, addressing skill gaps and 
preventing the erosion of skills resulting from unemployment, non-
participation and exclusion throughout the lifecycle’.  
• GL 4: Member States ‘are therefore called upon to improve the quality 
of their education and training systems, as well as the relevant curricula, 
including the provision of appropriate guidance in the context of both 
initial training and lifelong learning, the modernization and greater 
effectiveness of apprenticeship systems and of in-work training, and 
promote the development of multi-purpose local learning centres’. 
• GL 7: Combating discrimination and promoting social inclusion by 
access to employment. ‘Many groups and individuals experience 
particular difficulties in acquiring relevant skills and in gaining access to, 
and remaining in, the labour market. This may increase the risk of 
exclusion. A coherent set of policies is called for to promote social 
inclusion by supporting the integration of disadvantaged groups and 
individuals into the world of work, and promoting the quality of their 
employment. Discrimination in access to, and on the labour market, 
should be combated’. 
• GL 10: New opportunities for employment in the knowledge-based 
society and in services. ‘If the European Union wants to deal successfully 
with the employment challenge, all possible sources of jobs and new 
technologies must be exploited effectively. Innovative enterprises must 
find a supportive environment because they can make an essential 
contribution to mobilising the job creation potential of the knowledge-
based society. A considerable potential for jobs and for increasing 
quality in work exists in particular in the services sector. The environment 
sector in particular may open important possibilities of allowing the low-
skilled to enter the labour market, and there is also a potential to 
upgrade workers' skills through the more rapid introduction of modern 
environment technology’. 
• GL 11: Regional and local action for employment. All actors at the 
regional and local levels, including the social partners, must be 
mobilised to implement the European Employment Strategy by 
identifying the potential of job creation at local level and strengthening 
partnerships to this end. Member States will ‘promote measures to 
enhance the competitive development and the capacity of the social 
economy to create more jobs and to enhance their quality, especially 
the provision of goods and services linked to needs not yet satisfied by 
the market, and examine, with the aim reducing, any obstacles to such 
measures’. 
• GL 13: ‘The opportunities created by the knowledge-based economy 
and the prospect of an improved level and quality of employment 
require a consequent adaptation of work organisation and the 
contribution to the implementation of Life Long Learning strategies by all 
actors including enterprises, in order to meet the needs of workers and 
employers’. In order to promote the modernisation of work organisation 
and forms of work, which inter alia contribute to improvements in quality 
in work, a strong partnership should be developed at all appropriate 
levels (European, national, sectoral, local and enterprise levels). 
 
According to horizontal objective B laid down in the Commission 
proposal on Guidelines for Member States' employment policies for the 
year 2002 ‘Member States will ensure that policies across the four pillars 
contribute to raising quality in work. Such actions should take into 
account both job characteristics (such as intrinsic job quality, skills, lifelong 
learning and career development) and the wider labour market context 
encompassing gender equality, health and safety at work, flexibility and 
security, inclusion and access to the labour market, work organisation 
and work-life balance, social dialogue and worker involvement, diversity 
and non-discrimination and overall work performance and productivity’. 
 
Besides, according to horizontal objective F of the Commission proposal 
on ‘Member States” and the Commission should strengthen the 
development of common indicators in order to evaluate adequately 
progress under all four pillars, including with regard to quality of work, and 
to underpining the setting of benchmarks and the identification of good 
practices. The social partners are invited to develop appropriate 
indicators and benchmarks and supporting statistical databases to 
measure progress in the actions for which they are responsible. In 
particular, the Member states should evaluate and report on the 
efficiency of their policy measures in terms of their impact on labour 
market outcomes’. 
 
 
2.3. Evaluation of Quality in Community Industrial Relations: the need to 
develop comparable indicators 
 
In this regard, in the literature it has rightly pointed out that it is impossible 
to monitor progress in Member States without comparable indicators on 
outcomes in social policy. 
 
According F. Vandenbroucke, (2001, § 5), we need a set of indicators 
which truly reflect the various relevant dimensions at stake: ‘in order to 
arrive at an intrinsically adequate and politically acceptable set of 
indicators, we have to simultaneously follow both a top-down and 
bottom-up approach’. More precisely, the top-down approach can be 
based on general structural indicators along the lines suggested in the 
European Commission’s Communication, while the driving forces behind 
the bottom-down approach should be the National Employment Plans. 
In this perspective F. Vandenbroucke emphasises the importance of 
establishing a link between quality indicators and objectives according 
to the three different lines indicated in box n. 5 (in the same perspective 
see also: J. Morely, 2001). 
 
     Box 5 – Establishing a link between indicators and objectives 
 
 
V. First, decision-makers could politically adopt a limited number of key 
indicators, which could be established on the basis of the aforementioned 
Commission’s structural indicators with regard to "social cohesion". Even 
though some additional work and refinement will be required on some of 
them, and even though we may have to add one or two indicators, for 
example with reference to the measurement of the poverty intensity, or, 
as some argue, the "low-wage employees", these indicators are an 
excellent starting point. 
 
VI. Apart from these structural indicators, which one could also call the 
"key" indicators, we might be able to agree on a limited number of 
secondary indicators, which would aim at refining the very general key 
indicators. For instance, in the key indicators the Commission considers 
60% of the median (equivalised) income to be the "poverty threshold". In 
the secondary indicators we could complement this measure with the 50% 
and 70% thresholds, which would shed additional light on the issue. 
Another example of this "refining" could be one that refers to subjective 
poverty, namely the one that is subjectively perceived by people. Some of 
these secondary indicators could be harmonised at EU level, while others 
would be country-specific. 
 
VII. Finally, we could try and find a commitment on the precise areas or 
dimensions for which, within an ambitious timetable, new social cohesion 
indicators should be developed, as well as on the principles and the 
criteria that should be applied when developing them. These indicators 
would clearly illustrate the multidimensionality of the concepts of "poverty" 
and "social exclusion", which also cover fields such as housing (we could 
think of an indicator for homelessness), access to health care and other 
essential services, as well as social and cultural participation and 
deprivation. A number of these indicators will initially have to be defined, 
at the national level, depending on the available information. 
 
 
 The result of the exercise would be a limited set of shared and rather 
general "key" indicators, complemented with some more specific EU and 
national indicators, both of which link ambitions and progress in fighting 
poverty and social exclusion in Member States to the objectives agreed 
by the Nice European Council. In this exercise, the Indicator’s subgroup of 
the Social Protection Committee will have a key role to play. 
 
 The indicators are not a vehicle for defining any pecking order among 
Europe’s nations, but a tool to preserve and rejuvenate Europe’s hallmark 
of social protection for its citizens. Indeed, a credible commitment to 
combat poverty and social exclusion presupposes a firm commitment to 
the establishment of a fully-fledged welfare state. And, where the latter 
exists, an equally firm commitment to its preservation and continuous 
adaptation to social needs. The set of indicators combines national 
informational advantage on specific problems and solutions with a key 
supranational goal that is fundamentally the same for everyone: progress 
towards more social cohesion and social quality. It carries the promise of 
making subsidiarity work, and making it work in the same beneficial 
direction. 
 
F. Vandenbroucke, 2001, § 5 
 
 
 
In the literature it is possible to reach a general agreement on the need 
to develop comparable indicators to make it possible to assess the 
implementation and the impact of the above mentioned qualitative 
criteria, mainly of those drawn on the basis of the employment GLs, and 
to further elaborate on the targets, in order to facilitate the identification 
and exchange of the best practices. The social parties have been 
invited to develop appropriate indicators and benchmarks and 
supporting statistical databases to measure progress in the actions for 
which they are responsible. In this perspective M. Biagi (2001b) has 
defined a good system of industrial relations as having the criteria 
indicated in box n. 6.  
 
 
    Box 6 – Industrial Relations: Quality Criteria 
 
 
(1) contributing to the establishment of social cohesion as well as to the 
increase of competitiveness, making sustainable economic growth possible; 
 
(2) recognizes full employment as an overarching objective, prepares the 
transition to a knowledge-based economy, and reaps the benefits of the 
information and communication technologies; 
 
(3) favours the creation, of good quality employment by fostering 
employability and developing the modernisation of the regulatory 
framework according to changes in work organization; 
 
(4) develops a policy for active ageing with the aim of enhancing the 
capacity of and incentives for older workers to remain in the labour force as 
long as possible; 
 
(5) promotes conditions to facilitate better access for adults, including those with a-typical 
contracts, to lifelong learning, so as to increase the proportion of the adult working-age 
population (25-64 years old) participating at any given time in education and training; 
 
(6) contributes to the development of policies to prevent skills shortages, also 
by promoting occupational and geographical mobility; 
 
(7) develops pathways consisting of effective preventive and active policy 
measures to promote the integration into the labour market of groups and 
individuals at risk or with a disadvantage, in order to avoid marginalization, 
the emergence of ‘working poor’ and a drift into exclusion; 
 
(8) implements appropriate measures to meet the need of the disabled, ethnic 
minorities and migrant workers as regards their integration into the labour 
market; 
 
(9) removes barriers to exploit fully the employment potential of the service 
sector, with special reference to a knowledge based society and the 
environmental sector; 
 
(10) contributes to preparing for the enlargement of the European Union 
under conditions of balanced and social development; 
 
(11) is based on a strong partnership developed at all appropriate levels 
(European, national, sectoral, local and enterprise); 
 
(12) is aimed at creating an adaptable workforce, reconciling flexibility and 
security of employment via adequate training and educational measures; 
 
(13) ensures a better application at the workplace level of health and safety 
regulations, by improving training and by promoting measures for the 
reduction of occupational accidents and diseases in traditionally high risk 
sectors; 
 
(14) is environmentally-friendly, thus paying attention to the impact of 
collectively agreed rules on the quality of living conditions; 
 
(15) aims at implementing a lifelong learning strategy, to facilitate 
adaptability and innovation, particularly in the field of information and 
communication technologies, also by giving every worker the opportunity 
to achieve information society literacy by 2003; 
 
(16) is inspired by a gender mainstreaming approach, in order to meet the 
objective of equal opportunity and in any case increasing the employment 
rate, particularly for women; 
 
(17) is founded on highly-representative social parties, i.e. able to represent 
most of employers and employees, either through direct membership or via 
other channels (e.g. support in industrial action); 
 
(18) is characterised by a wide coverage of collective bargaining, both in 
terms of corporations (size, industry, etc.) and workers (full vs. part time, 
open-ended vs. fixed-terms, etc.); 
 
(19) promotes the use of methods to prevent and/or settle labour disputes, 
via non-judicial mechanisms, such as mediation, conciliation and 
arbitration, in both collective and individual cases; 
 
(20) promotes employee participation, from the viewpoint of the decision- 
making process as well as in financial terms, so as to enhance the 
productivity of the workforce. 
 
Source: M. Biagi, 2001b 
 
 
According A. Ioannou (2001), industrial relations evaluations may include 
aspects like working conditions and pay formation. Working conditions 
should be considered the basic indicator of quality in industrial relations. 
Under these indicators ‘we need to create and use indicators on both 
industrial relations processes and outcomes’. 
 
    Box 7 – How to evaluate the quality of industrial relations? 
 
 
Process indicators: 
 
- On working conditions: process requirements of Framework directive 
(coverage of labour force and companies by workers representatives for 
H&S, awareness of employees and HR managers on availability of company 
risk assessment; 
- On pay structures and IR regulations: individual or collective (coverage of 
labour force and companies by collective agreements); 
- On individual IR regulations: Firm and labour force coverage by active HRM 
policies (employee attitude surveys, various types of circle-quality etc.); 
- On types of collective regulations: consultation, participation, bargaining 
(the extent to which various collective agreements apply to the labour 
force overall); 
- On the classification of behaviour in the collective regulations: conflict or 
consensus? (is third party intervention necessary to settle disputes?). 
 
Outcomes indicators 
 
- Working conditions (1): comparable national data on accidents at work 
and occupational diseases; 
- Working conditions (2): cost of occupational accidents and diseases for 
companies, social security systems, national health systems; 
- On pay formations (1): general wage growth and productivity growth; 
- On pay formations (2): wage drift; 
- On pay formations (3): share of flexible elements in “final pay” (productivity 
bonus, merit pay, ESOPs, etc.). 
 
 
 Data sources: (1) on working conditions: European Foundation Surveys on 
Working Conditions and Eurostat projects on workplace injuries and 
occupational diseases. 
 
 Data sources: (2) on pay and IR regulations: Eurostat data and 
Development surveys based on national experiences. 
 
 
Source: A. Ioannou, 2001, Brussels 
 
 
 
The assumed doctrinal position in fact is accepted by the Commission 
that has elaborated in its Communication from 20 June 2001 the series of 
quality indicators (see box 8).  
 
The Communication first looks at the relationship between quality of work and 
the modernisation of the European social model. It then considers how to 
define quality and goes on to consider the development of indicators of quality 
in work. It finally looks at applying and using these definitions and indicators 
through a process of quality reviews. 
 
The role of the indicators defined by the Commission is to allow an 
assessment of how successful Member States and EU policies are at 
reaching quality in work goals across these 10 areas. Of course, some 
indicators are easier to be assessed, others are more complex. The 
Commission underlines the importance of avoiding interpreting indicators 
in a simplistic way (European Commission, 2000d, para. 8) and of relating 
them clearly to policy objectives and standards, and to policy 
instruments. (European Commission, 2001c, 10). 
 
 
   Box 8 – Main Indicators of Job Quality in EC Communication 
 
                                                
 
Indicators: 
 
 
 
1) Intrinsic job quality  
 
- Job satisfaction among workers, taking, into account 
contractual arrangements and working time, and level of 
qualification relative to job requirement; 
- The proportion of workers advancing to higher paid 
jobs over a period of time; 
- Low wage earners, the working poor, and income 
distribution. 
 
2) Skills, life-long learning and career development  
 
- Proportion of workers with medium and high levels of 
education;  
- Proportion of workers undertaking training or other forms of 
life-long learning;  
- Proportion of workers with basic or higher levels of digital 
literacy.  
 
3) Gender equality  
 
- Gender gap, appropriately adjusted for such factors as 
sector, occupation and age; 
- Gender segregation – extent to which women and men are 
over or under-represented in different professions and sectors; 
- Proportion of women and men with different levels of 
responsibility within professions and sectors, taking account of 
factors such as age and education. 
 
4) Health and safety at work 
 
- Composite indicators of accidents at work- fatal and serious – 
including costs;  
- Rates of occupational disease, including new risks e.g. 
repetitive strain;  
- Stress levels and other difficulties concerning working 
relationships. 
 
5) Flexibility and security  
 
- The effective coverage of social protection systems- in terms 
of the scope of eligibility and level of support – for those in 
work, or seeking work 
- Proportion of workers with flexible working arrangements – as 
seen by employers and workers;  
- Job losses – proportion of workers losing their job through 
redundancies, and the proportion of those finding alternative 
employment in a given period;  
- Proportion of workers changing the geographical location of 
their jobs. 
 
6) Inclusion and access to the labour market  
 
- Effective transition of young people to active  employment;  
- Employment and long-term unemployment rates by age, 
educational level, and region;  
- Labour market bottlenecks and mobility between sectors and 
occupations. 
 
7) Work organisation and work-life balance  
 
- Proportion of workers with flexible working arrangements;  
- Opportunities for maternity and parental leave, and take-up 
rates; 
- Scale of child-care facilities for pre-school and primary school 
age groups.  
 
8) Social dialogue and worker involvement  
 
- Coverage of collective agreements;  
- Proportion of workers with a financial interest/participation in 
the firms where they are employed;  
- Working days lost in the industrial disputes.  
 
9) Diversity and non-discrimination 
 
- Employment rates and pay gaps of older workers compared 
with average employment rates;  
- Employment rates and pay gaps of persons with disabilities, 
and persons from ethnic minorities – compared with the 
average; 
- Information on the existence of labour market complaints 
procedures, and successful outcomes.  
 
10) Overall work performance  
 
- Average hourly productivity per worker;  
- Average annual output per worker;  
- Average per capita annual living standards of population – 
taking account of the rate of employment and the 
dependency ratio;  
 
Source: European Commission,  2001c, 22-26 
 
 
 
Quality goals, instruments and indicators are already, to some extent, 
and in various ways, incorporated in the European Employment Strategy. 
This is most notable in relation to the European Employment Guidelines. 
Promoting individual employability  (pillar 1 of the guidelines) is about 
improving the prospects of finding a job and upgrading skills, while 
promoting adaptability (pillar 3) focuses on the modernisation of work 
organisation through a process of dialogue between the social partners 
and the government. Moreover the promotion of equal opportunities 
(“tackling gender gaps”) had been one of the key dimensions (pillar 4) 
from the start of the Luxembourg process (European Commission, 2001c, 
14).  
 
To pursue these goals all appropriate policy tools need to be considered. 
This includes the identification of good practices, benchmarking, 
legislation, social partner agreements, NGO contributions, and specific 
incentives.  In this way the Quality Reviews – covering the coherence 
between policy objectives and standards, indicators, and instruments – 
will play a valuable role in helping define and implement the wide range 
of actions laid down in the Social Policy Agenda. (European Commission, 
2001c, 15).  
 
the emphasis on more and better jobs, and on the modernisation of the 
European social model, the Commission: 
 
proposes a framework for promoting the goal of improving quality in of work, 
particularly through the establishment of a coherent and broad set of indicators 
on quality in work which can be  used in order to strengthen the coherence 
between the quality in work objectives and policy instruments within the 
context of the European employment str  
o In the context of the new economic and social agenda in Europe, with 
ategy. 
 
o aims to ensure that the goal of improving quality is fully and coherently 
integrated in employment and social policy through a progressive series of 
quality reviews for which the Commission will present initiatives at the 
appropriate time. 
 
The Commission intends to ensure that work on quality indicators in the 
employment and social domain will continue to be developed and taken 
forward in the future, drawing fully on the capacities of the European agencies 
working in these fields, and in co-operation with the other institutions (European 
Commission, 2001c).  
 
 
2.4. Quality of Industrial Relations and Quality of Employment: the role of 
Social Parties and the Transposition of EU Directives at the domestic level 
 
According to the annual guidelines of the European Employment 
Strategy, the social parties have received the mandate to contribute for 
‘an improved level and quality of employment (...) increasing the quality 
of jobs”. In this perspective it has been noted that the quality of 
employment depends also on the activity of the social parties, i.e. on the  
quality of industrial relations (M. Biagi, 2001b) . 
 
Speaking of the quality of jobs is not at all a new topic, at least at the 
Community level, and one cannot believe that this is a perspective to be 
tackled only in terms of soft-laws, such as the ‘employment guidelines’. 
The  more and better jobs principle, combining employment-friendly and 
quality-oriented provisions  may be already found in hard-laws, such as 
the fixed-term (n. 99/70/CE) and part-time work directives (n. 97/81/CE). 
 
Social parties have agreed to ‘improve the quality of fixed-term work by 
ensuring the application of the principle of non-discrimination’ (Purpose - 
clause 1). The employment-friendly provision is founded on the fact that 
‘objective reasons’ are not requested for the first fixed-term agreement. 
The parties have agreed on ‘measures to prevent abuse’ of such 
contracts or relationships, i.e. to preserve their quality, by requiring 
‘objective reasons justifying the renewal’. Management and labour have 
also agreed to regulate part-time work. Their aim is ‘to provide for the 
removal of discrimination against part-time workers and to improve the 
quality of part-time work’. After this quality-oriented provision, the social 
parties recognised the employment-potential of this work arrangement 
and also agreed ‘to facilitate the development of part-time work on a 
voluntary basis and to contribute to the flexible organisation of working 
time in a manner which takes into account the needs of employers and 
workers’ (Clause 1: Purpose).  
  
Both agreements, as transformed into directives, belong to a generation 
which is clearly inspired by the EES. They aim at reconciling job 
promotion with job protection. ‘Atypical’ employment relationships 
proved to be effective in creating new jobs and should consequently be 
encouraged (more jobs). At the same time the political mandate - 
mainly after the Lisbon summit - is clear enough in requiring to preserve a 
level of protection as to guarantee the quality of these forms of 
employment, preventing possible abuses (better jobs). Far from every 
deregulatory temptation, the strategy of re-regulation via social 
dialogue is confirmed.  
  
In spite of the importance of the frame-work agreements and relative 
implementation directives the process of transposition into the national 
legal systems demonstrates the weakness of the mechanism for the 
reception of the communitarian principles and disciplines. In fact the 
cases of the fix-term work and part-time work highlight how the 
communitarian  regulations were often used  in order to obtain national 
political aims without any coordination at the community level. The 
doctrine has demonstrated how the notions of part-time work and high 
quality work conflict at the national level.    
 
In some legal systems, like Italy’s the transposition of a directive on a fix-
term work generated considerable change of the industrial relations 
system which generated conflict between trade unions.  In Italy the 
debate relating to the quality of fix-term work gave birth to the 
clamorous split in the union movement as CGIL (the main workers trade 
union) which refused to sign the joint statement highlighting 
recommendations for the further transposition of the communitarian 
directive into Italian legislation.    
 
In Italy the transposition of the directive on part-time work generated the 
strong confrontation between the government and the social partners. 
The centre-leftist faction of the government formulated plans to 
transpose the directive without the joint statement of the social partners.  
Thus, the social partners (with the exception of the CGIL) did not agree 
with the subsequent decree. Therefore  the government had to issue a 
corrective decree of the first legislative act on the directive transposition. 
The legal rigidity related to the use of part-time work are still so relevant 
that the legal framework is not sufficient to meet the requirements of 
employers and employees. So the centre-right government has decided 
to reshape the legislative framework in the next few months. The tensions 
regarding the regulations of part-time work and fixed-term work in the 
Italian legal system reflect problems in the Italian industrial relations 
system.  Uncertainty about the transposition of the directive discourages 
employers and employees from utilizing part-time employment schemes.  
Other member states such as Spain, the UK, and Sweden face the same 
problem as the transportation process created difficulties their national 
industrial relations systems.  
 
This is the reason why it would be highly advisable to develop a 
monitoring system on the way in which directives in social as well as 
employment affairs are actually at the domestic level (see infra, § 4). 
The process of transposition of directives on fixed-term contract and 
part-time work confirm that the main problem is how to interpret the 
notion of quality of jobs as being a relative concept with many 
dimensions (European Commission, 2001c, 7). The understanding of what 
constitutes a good job differ deeply from individual to individual, from 
sector to sector, from one political sector to another, and in general from 
country to country. 
 
  
2.4.1. The case of  EU Directive on Fixed-term Work  
 
From another perspective, one should not underestimate the difficulties 
concerning the adoption of universal obligatory policies regarding the 
transposition of all community directives (cfr. M. Jeffery, 1995, 296 e ss.). 
This is particularly problematic in the case of fixed-time work.       
Indeed, the first commentators have rightly highlighted the symbolic 
importance of the framework agreement (M. Biagi, 1999, 17-19; M. Weiss, 
1999, 96 et seqq.; R. Blanpain, 1999b, 85 et seqq.; P. Lorber, 1999, 121 et 
seqq.) and it could not have been otherwise. As pointed out by the 
former Social Affairs Commissioner, Padraig Flynn,1 regulating fixed-term 
contracts was ‘by far the most politically sensitive and technically difficult 
issue that the social partners have tackled in formal negotiations at the 
European level as yet, and that the successful outcome of the 
negotiations show that they are ready to shoulder their new 
responsibilities under the Amsterdam Treaty’. A further symbolic value of 
the framework agreement, also underlined by Commissioner Flynn, 
relates to the circumstance ‘that social partners signed the agreement in 
Warsaw at a major conference on social dialogue and enlargement, 
marking the importance agreed by all actors to promote the social 
dialogue in the applicant countries’.2  
 
                                                 
1 See the speech of Padraig Flynn welcoming the conclusion of the new European 
Agreement on Fixed-term contracts in http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg05/soc-
dial/social/fixedpress_en.htm. 
2 Ibidem. 
Analysed in the context of the co-ordination of employment policies at 
the European level, the agreement of course represents an undeniable 
sign of vitality in the European bargaining process - the results of which 
are significant, especially if we think about the representative weakness 
of the social parties and above all the failure of the recent past. The 
institutional spaces for a European collective agreement - disclosed by 
the social chapter in the Treaty of Maastricht and consolidated by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam - have in effect revealed themselves to be 
sufficient enough to allow the Euro-actors to experiment a praxis which 
represents a step forward with respect to the traditional conception of 
social dialogue (M. Schmidt, 1999, 259-269). 
 
Nevertheless, examined in the wider context of the trends of labour law 
development in the era of globalisation, a deeper reading of the 
contents of the agreement induces some perplexities both on the 
technique of regulation of this contractual scheme as well as on the 
goals of the policy of the law pursued by the social parties. Looking at 
the process of the institutional transformation of the European Union 
anyone can underestimate the political importance of the agreement, 
even though the results obtained are decidedly modest compared to 
the more ambitious attempts at regulating atypical/temporary work of 
the early Nineties See (M. Jeffery, 1998, 296 et seqq., spec. 205-213; M. 
Roccella, 1991, 27 et seqq.; M. Tiraboschi, 2002b, 41 et. Seqq.). However, 
it is extremely difficult to escape the feeling that the agreement has 
been inspired by an antiquated configuration of the relationship 
between capital and labour. What is missing is a strategy of regulation 
on the ways to utilise labour other than that established in the industrial 
era; completely neglected, consequently, is the logic that today governs 
the mechanisms of production and the circulation of wealth (M. 
Tiraboschi, 1999, 145 et seqq.; M. Weiss, 1999; R. Blanpain, 1999b). 
 
In effect, the comprehensive structure of the framework agreement 
provides a juridical representation of fixed-term work somewhat modest 
compared to the discipline in force in the majority of the Member States 
of the European Community (R. Blanpain, 1993; D. Meulders et al., 1994; 
K. Schömann et al., 1995; C. Vigneau et al., 1999; S. Clauwaert, 1998). A 
representation that, in any case, seems far removed from the modern 
logic behind the utilisation of temporary work. 
 
Nobody  can deny the deep ethical and juridical meaning of the 
principle of job stability (see, among the others, R. Blanpain, 1980). For 
reasons well-known linked to globalisation and internationalisation the 
labour markets that we study today however the markets of the XXIst 
Century have changed greatly. Not only will they be characterised ever 
by the hegemonic force of the contract of an indefinite period they 
appear destined to marginalize the traditional distinction between the 
employee and the self-employed. 
 
Conversely, the framework agreement confirms the centrality of 
subordinate work for an indefinite period, thereby shaping fixed-term 
work as a mere exception. From an ideological and cultural point of 
view, the option followed by the social parties in favour of job stability is 
shared by the majority of the scholars. (see, among the others, B. Caruso, 
1999). Presented in terms of a mere opposition between fixed-term and 
indefinite duration contracts, the contradiction between the legal 
dimension and the socio-economic reality is nevertheless evident. 
 
In Italy, for example, in large companies the standard contractual 
scheme (full-time and indefinite duration) now makes up less than 50 per 
cent of new contracts. In all, the number of workers employed with a 
fixed-term contract is still low, not exceeding 4 per cent of the work 
force; however, if one assesses the level of new hiring, the fixed-term 
contract reaches 25 per cent of the workers in small companies and 33 
per cent in large ones. Statistics indicate, in each case, that the 
occupational increase which has characterised work in industrial 
companies must be attributed almost entirely to flexible contracts like 
fixed-term, temporary work through agency, part-time work, 
apprenticeship, labour and training contracts, job sharing, etc. These 
kinds of contracts affect about 45 per cent of new hirings (source: ISTAT). 
In continual expansion is then the area of self-employment and 
associated work and, above all, the area of temporary and quasi-
subordinate employment, which today affects no less than 1,480,380 
workers of whom 57 per cent are men and 43 per cent women. (source: 
CNEL). Going back though once again to the notion of fixed-term work, 
although not really akin to the juridical case in point of fixed-term work, 
there are then numerous types of contracts which operate in the margins 
of subordinate employment involving an ever more extensive group of 
workers: apprentices, training contracts, stages, etc. A phenomenon 
undeniably Italian, even if present in other industrialised countries in a 
substantial measure, is that of the underground economy According to 
the most recent estimates, undeclared or “black” work in Italy involves 
approximately 5 million irregular job positions - in particular, work done on 
an occasional or temporary basis - out of a total work force of 20 million 
workers (source: ISTAT). 
 
In a comparative perspective, particularly interesting are the data 
collected in figure 7 which contains the results from a research by F. 
Schneider, ‘The Value Added of Underground Activities: Size and 
Measurement of the Shadow Economies and Shadow Economy Labor 
Force all over the World’, 2000 (in 
http://rost.trevano.ch/~forti/ShadEcWorldbank.htm). Using various 
methods Schneider estimates about the size of the shadow economy in 
76 developing, transition and OECD countries are presented. The 
average size of the shadow economy (in percent of official GDP) over 
1989-93 in developing countries is 39%, in transition countries 23% and in 
OECD countries 14.1%. The average size of the shadow economy labour 
force (in percent of the official labour force) of the year 1997/98 in 51 
developing countries is 50,1%, in 9 transition countries 49,0% and 7 OECD-
countries 17,3%. An increasing burden of taxation and social security 
contributions combined with rising state regulatory activities are the 
driving forces for the growth and size of the shadow economy (labour 
force). See also: F. Schneider, 1997, 42-48; F. Schneider, 1998; F. 
Schneider, 2000b, Charleston, S.C.; F. Schneider et al., 77-114). 
 
 
Figure 7: The Size of the Shadow Economy in OECD Countries 
Size of the Shadow Economy (in % of GDP) using: 
Currency Demand Method OECD-
Countries 
Average 
1989/90 
Average 
1990/93 
Average 
1994/95 
Average 
1997/98 
1. Australia 10.1 13.0 13.5 14.0 
2. Austria 6.9 7.1 8.6 9.0 
3. Belgium 19.3 20.8 21.5 22.5 
4. Canada 12.8 13.5 14.8 16.2 
5. Denmark 10.8 15.0 17.8 18.3 
6. Finland 13.4 16.1 18.2 18.9 
7. France 9.0 13.8 14.5 14.9 
8. Germany 11.8 12.5 13.5 14.9 
9. Great Britain 9.6 11.2 12.5 13.0 
10. Greece 22.6 24.9 28.6 29.0 
11. Ireland 11.0 14.2 15.4 16.2 
12. Italy 22.8 24.0 26.0 27.3 
13. Japan 8.8 9.5 10.6 11.1 
14. 
Netherlands 
11.9 12.7 13.7 13.5 
15. New 
Zealand1) 
9.2 9.0 11.3 11.9 
16. Norway 14.8 16.7 18.2 19.6 
17. Portugal 15.9 17.2 22.1 23.1 
18. Spain 2) 16.1 17.3 22.4 23.1 
19. Sweden 15.8 17.0 19.5 19.9 
20. Switzerland 6.7 6.9 7.8 8.1 
21. USA 6.7 8.2 8.8 8.9 
Average over 
21 OECD 
countries 
13.2 14.3 15.7 16.8 
 
Sources: Currency demand approach own calculations and Schneider (1994a, 1998a).  
 
1) The Figures are calculated using the MIMIC-method and Currency demand approach. Source Giles (1999b).  
2) The figures have been calculated from Mauleon (1998).  
 
At EU level the increase in employment on temporary contracts-both 
absolute and shares-was observed in all Member States with the 
exception of Spain, Denmark, Ireland and the UK. It was strongest in 
Portugal, Italy, Greece, Sweden and Netherlands.  
 
Figure 8 – Employees with a Temporary Contract  
 
 
 
Source: European Commission 2001b, 20 
 
The empirical data in their severity repudiate the affirmation of the 
principle contained in the Preamble of the agreement, and 
consequently, the philosophy behind it, which permeates, on the basis of 
this presupposition, all the single clauses signed by the parties. Unless one 
deals with a mere petition of principle directed at exorcising the end of a 
myth – that of work which is stable and for a life-time – the affirmation of 
the purely exceptional character of fixed-term work is, today, sustainable 
only at the level of having to be legal, but not at the level of facts. The 
price of this choice is therefore high. Neglecting the subordination of the 
legal dimension to the rules of economics, the formal acceptance of a 
model of regulation of the labour and capital relationship in decline (like 
the employment of indefinite duration) imposes to legitimise, on the 
factual level, a  creeping deregulation of employment relationships. The 
consequence is the incessant immersion of contractual schemes of 
praeter and contra legem labour which contribute in the long run to 
impoverish even more the protection of both temporary and stable 
employment (see: J. Visser, 1998). 
In reality, also from a formal point of view, the text of the agreement 
presents serious limits and some clear contradictions. A precise 
statement of the gaps in the framework agreement is contained in the 
recent Report on the Commission proposal for a Council Directive 
concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by 
UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC of 12 March 1999. The position of the 
European Parliament,3 which is nevertheless in favour of the choice 
directed at marginalizing fixed-term work, is shared fully especially where 
it: 
 
‘notes that the agreement allows fixed-term employees to be placed at a 
disadvantage compared with permanent employees on objective grounds 
without defining those grounds and insists that such discrimination must be 
restricted to an absolute minimum; 
 
‘notes that the agreement concluded by the social partners is confined to fixed-
term employment, and calls on the Commission to submit forthwith proposals for 
directives that will place the forms of atypical employment relationships that have 
not yet been regulated, in particular temporary work (through agencies) and 
telework, on the same footing as indefinite full-time working relationships’; 
 
‘points out that the agreement only covers employment relationships and 
excludes social security questions, which are in need of legal regulation (…)’; 
 
‘criticises the fact that the agreement only establishes provisions for successive 
fixed-term employment relationships’; 
 
‘regrets the non-binding nature of the provisions that are supposed to prevent 
abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment, because they do 
not comprise any qualitative or quantitative standards, so that the agreement 
itself will not automatically ensure that the situation of fixed-term employees really 
does improve, which will then have to be achieved by transposing the agreement 
into national rules’; 
 
‘Points out that the agreement does not set a uniform European minimum 
standard for successive fixed-term employment contracts (…)’. 
 
The need to make the discipline fit in the fifteen Member States has 
brought about a compromise that is particularly fragile and full of gaps. 
In fact, as pointed out by the European Parliament itself, the framework 
agreement is destined to require the introduction of new legislation on 
the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts in two Members 
States only. Too limited for continental legislation, however, the 
framework can not compel continental member states to adopt policy 
consistent with its objectives (i.e. substantial limits on the stipulations of 
this kind of contract, automatic conversion of an irregular fixed-term 
contract into one of indefinite duration. But too extensive for countries 
like the UK and Ireland, on whom the framework agreement imposes the 
adoption of a discipline capable of unhinging the traditional logic of the 
regulation of the employment relationship. It is worthy of note that in 
those two countries no substantial limits presently exist on the stipulation 
of employment relationships of an occasional, temporary or intermittent 
nature (P. Lorber,  1999,  121 et seqq.). This is the reason why UK 
Government has recently asked one year of delay in transposing the 
directive (http://www.eiro.eirofound.ie). 
                                                 
3 It is significant to note that the Preliminary Draft of the Report was more critical. 
Instead of soft expression like “The Parliament … notes”, “… point’s out”, “… regrets”  
and so on, the Preliminary Draft was often more direct  in criticising the framework 
agreement. For example, in all the points underlined in the text with the use of italics the 
incipit was “The Parliament … criticises …”. 
 
It is also questionable the choice of regulating, on separate negotiating tables, first part-
time work, then fixed-term work and, in the future, temporary work through an agency.4 
In this way, the ETUC, UNICE and CEEP not only precluded themselves from a broad 
table of negotiation on flexibility and job security, which would have undoubtedly 
assured wider margins of mediation, but above all they have impeded a comprehensive 
regulation of all the different types of atypical/temporary work. In this respect, the 
social parties seem to have therefore neglected that in a given juridical context the 
discipline of a singular contractual scheme depends on the regulation and functioning of 
all the other schemes (see: M. Tiraboschi, 1999). 
 
2.4.2. The Case of  EU Directive on Part-Time Work  
 
One important element of the quality of employment is linked to both 
the number of hours worked and the distribution of full-time vs. part-time 
work. As the statistic data of Eurostat testify the share of those employed 
in part-time jobs increased in all countries but Sweden in 2000. More than 
40% of all the employed worked part-time in the Netherlands, and 
between 20-25% in the UK, Sweden and Denmark. In Greece, Spain and 
Italy, the share of part-time workers remains below 10%. (Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9 -  Part- time Employment as a Share of Total Employment, 1995-
2000 
 
Source: European Commission, 2001b, 20 
 
In the EU, the percentage working part-time is much higher for women 
than for men, as shown in Figure 9. One of 3 women is working part-time, 
as compared to only one out of 16 men. The highest rate of part-time 
work amongst women is found in the Netherlands (68.6%), while it 
remains generally speaking low in the Southern Member States (GR., E.,I 
and PT).  
 
Figure 10 –  Part-time Employment as % of Total Employment in 1999 
 
                                                 
4 Following the breakdown of negotiations between UNICE, ETUC and CEEP 
(interprofessional social partners) in May 2001 on a framework agreement, the sectoral 
social partners for the temporary work sector (or agency work) decided to restart their 
own social dialogue. At the time of the breakdown, Commissioner Diamantopoulou 
announced that the Commission would prepare a proposal for a Directive on 
temporary work or agency work. On October 8 2001, the European federation for 
temporary work agencies (CIETT- Europe) and the trade union for agency workers (Uni- 
Europa) have signed a joint position for a European Directive on agency work.  
See: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/news/2001/oct/201_en.html 
Part-time employment as % of total employment in 1999
Total Males Females
B 19.8 4.7 39.9
DK 20.8 9.6 33.9
D 19.0 4.9 37.2
GR 6.1 3.6 10.2
E 8.3 3.0 17.6
F 17.2 5.6 31.7
IRL 16.7 7.4 30.6
I 7.9 3.4 15.7
L 10.7 1.8 24.6
NL 39.4 17.9 68.6
A 16.8 4.4 32.5
P 11.0 6.3 16.7
FIN 12.2 7.9 17.0
S 23.8 9.4 40.0
UK 24.8 8.9 44.4
EU 15 17.7 6.2 33.5
Source:  LFS, Eurostat.  
 
Source: Employment Performance in the EU and Job Quality, Labour market analysis, unit A.1, p.17. 
  
Figure 11 -   Part-time as % of Total Employment in 1995 and 1999 
 
1999 1995 1999 19 95 1999 1995
B 1 9 .8 13 .6 4 .7 2 .8 39 .9 29 .8
D K 2 0 .8 21 .6 9 .6 10 .4 33 .9 35 .5
D 1 9 .0 16 .3 4 .9 3 .6 37 .2 33 .8
G R 6 .1 4 .8 3 .6 2 .8 10 .2 8 .4
E 8 .3 7 .5 3 .0 2 .7 17 .6 16 .6
F 1 7 .2 15 .6 5 .6 5 .1 31 .7 28 .9
IR L 1 6 .7 12 .1 7 .4 5 .4 30 .6 23 .1
I 7 .9 6 .4 3 .4 2 .9 15 .7 12 .7
L 1 0 .7 7 .9 1 .8 1 .1 24 .6 20 .3
N L 3 9 .4 37 .3 1 7 .9 16 .7 68 .6 67 .3
A 1 6 .8 13 .9 4 .4 4 .0 32 .5 26 .9
P 1 1 .0 7 .5 6 .3 4 .2 16 .7 11 .6
F IN 1 2 .2 11 .8 7 .9 8 .0 17 .0 15 .8
S 2 3 .8 N .A . 9 .4 N .A . 40 .0 N .A .
U K 2 4 .8 24 .1 8 .9 7 .7 44 .4 44 .3
E U  1 5 1 7 .7 N .A . 6 .2 N .A . 33 .5 N .A .
Sou rce :  L F S , E u ros ta t.
T o ta l M a les F em a les
P a rt-tim e  e m p lo y m e n t a s  %  o f to ta l e m p lo y m e n t in  1 9 9 5  a n d  1 9 9 9
 
 
Source: Employment Performance in the EU and Job Quality, Labour market analysis, unit A.1, p.18 
 
The share of involuntary part- time work remains considerable in some 
Member States as shown in table. This is the case in Greece, France, Italy, 
Finland and Sweden where at least 25% of all part-time workers do so 
involuntary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12 - Involuntary Part-time Workers % of Total Part-time Employment 
in 1995 and 1999 
 
1999 1995 1999 1995 1999 1995
B 20.3 27.7 30.9 34.4 18.6 26.7
DK 15.3 17.1 12.6 14.1 16.2 18.1
D 13.0 9.8 18.0 12.9 12.2 9.4
GR 43.8 37.2 48.5 47.4 41.0 31.2
E 25.1 20.9 26.2 18.4 24.8 21.6
F 27.5 39.4 41.2 53.4 24.5 36.3
IRL 12.7 32.5 26.0 59.2 8.0 22.1
I 36.4 36.9 44.9 45.5 33.1 33.3
L 9.8 8.4 N.A. N.A. 9.9 7.3
NL 4.3 7.2 6.7 11.2 3.5 5.8
A 11.3 7.3 22.1 9.6 9.4 6.9
P 23.7 23.1 20.3 17.3 25.3 25.7
FIN 37.9 43.7 32.6 38.4 40.7 46.6
S 29.6 N.A. 33.5 N.A. 28.6 N.A.
UK 10.3 13.4 21.3 26.4 7.6 10.6
EU 15 16.8 N.A. 24.4 N.A. 15.0 N.A.
Source:  LFS, Eurostat.
Total Males Females
Involuntary part-time as % of total part time employment in 1995 and 1999
 
 
Source: Employment Performance in the EU and Job Quality, Labour market analysis, unit A.1, p.19 
 
The statistics demonstrate how limited the use of part-time work is- 
especially in central and southern Europe.  Also in this case the doctrine 
highlights that most problems other than cultural, are of the juridical 
character and are linked to the difficulty in the transposition of the 
communitarian directive which can provide incentives to the use of this 
particular contractual typology. In fact, in the transposition process in 
most legal systems maintain a lot of the disincentives concerning the use 
of part-time work (especially with reference to the so called flexible 
clauses, making thus this contractual instrument not very attractive both 
for the employers and employees). It seems very interesting from the 
comparative point of view of the recent publication of the French 
Conseil d’Analyse èconomique on “Le temps partial en France” (see 
Cette, 1999). Even if it is a rather unknown document as it was 
overshadowed by the clamour risen by the debate around the 
reduction of working hours to 35 hours per week it stresses the central 
themes concerning the case in point (see also the contributions in J. 
O’Reilly et al. 1998). 
 
The peculiarity of the French case allows us to better understand the 
problems and advantages in the regulation of part-time work. In France, 
in fact the a small percentage of the part-time contracts can at the first 
glance explain that the request of the part-time work is lower where the 
normal working hours are shorter. The research conducted by Conseil 
d’Analyse èconomique testifies that in comparison to other countries 
France grants the most financial support to the part-time work. This 
proves again that the framework for the protection of part-time work is in 
line with the Directive 97/8/CE and that economic incentives alone are 
not sufficient to guarantee the development of part-time work. The 
normative clauses are in this context equally important. Also these 
economic incentives shouldn’t be neutralised by their excessive inflation 
but should really influence the choices of the employers and employees 
as well as the quality of created jobs. 
 
The comparative research confirms that the adoption of the special 
economic incentive programmes in respect to the part-time work 
doesn’t seem to effectively promote the use of part-time employment 
(see M. Tiraboschi, 2000, 15 et seqq.).. Economic incentives programmes 
also have to be  made compatible with communitarian principles of the 
directive. Without adequate coordination they offer few economic 
benefits to employers in terms of work and production. In most cases the 
employers that use public financing resort to part-time work schemes 
without the economic incentives and wouldn’t hesitate to change the 
working hours after utilising  this funding.  The norms of this directive seem 
to create an imbalance between advantages and disadvantages 
offered to employers as administrative burdens cost employers more to 
assume workers on a part-time basis.   
 
The regulation of part-time work remains controversy. At the European 
level this debate does not seem so ideological as it does in Italy where 
the regulation of part time work has been under debate for more than 
30 years. The terms of comparison are well known and some 
fundamental passages can be given (more detailed information is in ILO, 
1993). In abstract terms one can affirm that part-time work relationships 
have advantages and disadvantages for employers and employees. 
 
For part-time workers one of the  many benefits is that they can combine work 
and family life (Sundstrom, 1994). This relationship is also of particular benefit to 
young people trying to enter the work force especially when it includes 
retirement benefits. Part-time work relationships also provide an alternative to 
redundancies in the case of excessive staff and provide employment 
opportunities when full time work is scarce. Part-time employment is also a 
disadvantage to employees as they are generally paid less than full time 
workers and have few prospects for career advancement. Such policies are 
particularly discriminatory against women as they are more likely to work under 
part time arrangements and are frequently given menial assignments at inferior 
wages. For the enterprises part-time work can guarantee the necessary 
flexibility in order to adapt to the fluctuations of demand, work organisation 
and the introduction of new technology. In the service sector, employers 
generally prefer this type of arrangement as studies show that part-time workers 
are generally more highly motivated and perform better than other “atypical” 
workers. But, as said before, the expenses associated with part-time 
employment are proportionally higher than those full time employment due to 
administrative and bureaucratic costs. Part time work is also presents 
advantage and risk to the government and social partners.  Incentives not only 
include the reduction of unemployment levels during recession periods but also 
increase the rate of participation in the labour market. Levels of participation in 
the labour market in Italy, however, are particularly low which has serious 
implications for the welfare system. The empirical data in this context are not 
very encouraging (cfr. Economia di Lavoro, 1999). 
 
Particularly uncertain is the boundary between voluntary part-time and 
involuntary part-time (J. O’Reilly et al, 1998). Less clear is the correlation 
between part-time work and employment performance. We cannot 
respond to these questions in abstract terms as every legal is unique.  
Part-time means completely different things that change from country to 
country and from one labour market to another respectively.  Where 
some statistics show that the growth of part time employment develops 
along with economic growth, other statistics contradict this data entirely 
(cfr. B. Fallick, 1999, 22-29).  
 
The inappropriate use of part-time work could result in under-
employment  on one hand, contribute irregular and underground 
employment on the other.  Unions are particularly adverse to part-time 
employment as part-time employees are generally not unionised. In 
summary part-time work must be evaluated on a case by case basis.  
Each legal system is unique and there is much difficulty surrounding the 
transposition of the part-time work directive into national legal systems 
(see: M. Tiraboschi, 2000).  
 
 
2.5. Quality of Work and Employee Involvement  
 
According to the European Commission employee involvement is one of 
the main factors which might determine the quality of a system of 
Industrial Relations. According the communication of the Commission on 
the quality of work one of the possible criteria which has been identified 
by the Commission is social dialogue and worker participation. 
According to the strategy launched in the European Council of Lisbon, it 
seems to be indispensable that labour and management would 
experiment intensively social dialogue, possibly leading towards an 
involvement of the employee (see the papers collected in M. Biagi, 
2002). This may be helpful in order to create a more productive working 
environment, in order to promote more productivity, in order to make 
introduction of new technologies easier, in order to make socially 
compatible economic adjustments, in order to make working life more 
family friendly and so (ibidem). 
 
At this regard, an important step towards a participation climate in EU 
Industrial Relations is the recent Directive on the European Company 
Statute, a long awaited European piece of legislation, which took more 
than 30 years of work (M. Weiss, 2002). There are reasonable 
expectations that also a second Directive on the information and 
consultation rights in national undertakings will be enacted next spring by 
the Council and the Parliament as soon as the conciliation procedure is 
successfully done (A. Neal, 2002). Consequently there are major 
innovations coming from the European Union which will have an impact 
on a domestic scale (see the papers collected in M. Biagi, 2002).  But the 
background for these two Directives is a third Directive which was 
enacted 7-8 years ago: the Directive on the European Works Councils 
(EWC). In the literature the EWC directive has been considered as an 
extremely important model which has made it possible to get the 
enactment of the European Company Statute firstly and later on the 
directive on information and consultation rights in national undertakings. 
Without the EWC Directive it would have been impossible, unthinkable 
that the European Company Statute be enacted (see: R. Blanpain, 2002; 
‘S. Demetriades, 2002). 
   
TT hh ess e   nn ew   Diii rrrectt iiivv ess    ––    ann d   alll ss o   ss ome   rrrecenn tt    rrress earrrchh    iiinn    tt hh e   arrrea   off    ff iiinn ann ciiialll    
parrrtt iiiciiipatt iiionn    (( ss ee   tt hh e   biiiblll iiiogrrraphh yy    iiinn    A...    PP enn dlllett onn ,,,   22 00 00 22 ;;;    M...    TT iii rrraboss chh iii ,,,    22 00 00 22 a))    ––       
hh avv e   rrre-- openn ed   ann    iiinn tt enn ss iiivv e   debatt e   onn    corrrporrratt e   govv errrnn ann ce,,,   onn    empllloyy ee   
iiinn vv olllvv emenn tt ,,,    onn    worrrkk errrss ’’    parrrtt iiiciiipatt iiionn ...    PP arrrtt iiiciiipatt iiionn    iii ss    ann    ollld   tt hh eme,,,   off    couu rrrss e   iii tt    iii ss    
nn ott    a   nn ew   tt opiiic...    BB uu tt    onn    tt hh e   bass iii ss    off    tt hh iii ss    iiinn puu tt    comiiinn g   ff rrrom   tt hh e   EE uu rrropeann    prrress enn tt    
ann d   ff uu tt uu rrre   Memberrr    SS tt att ess    prrrobablllyy    wiii lll lll    ss tt arrrtt    a   nn ew   diiiallloguu e,,,    a   nn ew   diii ss cuu ss ss iiionn    onn    
tt hh iii ss    tt hh eme   (( G...    BB aglll iiionn iii ,,,    22 00 00 22 ;;;    M...    SS ewerrryy nn ss kk iii ,,,    22 00 00 22 )) ...    TT hh iii ss    hh ass    alllwayy ss    beenn    tt hh e   cass e   
iiinn    tt hh e   pass tt    whh enn    a   tt hh eme   iii ss    ff iiinn alll lllyy    covv errred   byy    a   Commuu nn iii tt yy    iiinn ss tt rrruu menn tt    onn    a   
domess tt iiic   ss callle...    SS evv errralll    auu tt hh orrr    uu nn derrr lll iiinn e   tt hh e   ciii rrrcuu mss tt ann ce   tt hh att    a   nn ew   diii rrrectt iiivv e   
rrreprrress enn tt ss    a   ff uu nn damenn tt alll    iiinn puu tt    ff orrr    rrre-- openn iiinn g   a   morrre   prrragmatt iiic   diii ss cuu ss ss iiionn    (( ss ee   
M...    BB iiiagiii ,,,    22 00 00 22 ...)) ...    
   
Since after the EWC story we learnt finally that it is not possible to identify 
one single road in promoting employee involvement in various countries. 
It seems so simple, it seems so obvious, however for a long time the 
problems which have been linked with the discussion of European 
Company Statute, came from the assumption, that one model, or, at 
least, one procedure, had to be somehow imposed to all Member States 
of the EU. This has been a mistake  which has made the progress of the 
discussion on employee involvement slower than expected. The EWC 
story tells us that no predetermined model can be experimented, flexible 
arrangements have to be implemented. In other words, the European 
Company Statute Directive belongs to the new generation of directives  
which have been inaugurated by the EWC. In this context the old idea 
of harmonisation has been, if not dropped, at least reconsidered deeply.  
 
The challenge now is to co-ordinate the transposition measures in various 
Member States in order to achieve comparable results. That is, for 
instance in the case of EWC, to improve information and consultation. 
The way in which the different Member States will do that depends on 
their traditions, on their practices, on their willing, on their political 
decisions. This new generation of directives is interesting and 
controversial at the same time because, for instance in the case of 
European Company Statute, national governments are now facing the 
dilemma to transpose fully or partially the Directive on workers’ 
participation (M. Weiss, 2002). Because of the Spanish resistance there is 
an option. A compromise was found at the Nice European Council, 
granting national governments an option not to transpose the most 
controversial part of this Directive, that is to say the standard rules which 
discipline the board level workers’ participation. Is this a good way to 
progress in Community legislation, granting national governments opting 
outs? For some authors it seem to be inevitable to some extent, also 
because the membership of the EU is enlarging and it is not possible to 
force all governments, now 15, in the future 27, to be bound by identical 
rules. On the other side, one might argue that opting outs may be the 
end of real Community legislation, leaving room for too many 
exceptions, too many options and somehow re-introducing social 
dumping (see the papers collected in M. Biagi, 2002).  
   
IIInn    tt hh e   lll iii tt errratt uu rrre   hh ass    beenn    emphh ass iii ss ed   tt hh att    we   hh avv e   a   nn ew   genn errratt iiionn    off    
colll lllectt iiivv e   agrrreemenn tt ss    comiiinn g   ouu tt    off    tt hh e   exx perrr iiienn ce   off    tt hh ess e   Diii rrrectt iiivv ess ...    A   
colll lllectt iiivv e   agrrreemenn tt    iii ss    ss uu pposs ed   tt o   rrreplllace   ss omehh ow   ss tt ann darrrd   rrruu llless    tt o   tt hh e   
exx tt enn tt    tt hh att    a   prrre-- ff iiixx ed   agenn da   hh ass    beenn    ss uu ccess ss ff uu lll lllyy    nn egott iiiatt ed   byy    tt hh e   ss ociiialll    
parrrtt nn errrss ,,,    uu nn derrr    tt hh e   conn diii tt iiionn    tt hh att    a   prrre-- dett errrmiiinn ed   lll iii ss tt    off    tt opiiicss    hh avv e   beenn    
nn egott iiiatt ed...    SS o,,,    tt hh e   enn actt menn tt    off    a   colll lllectt iiivv e   agrrreemenn tt    iii ss    tt o   ss ome   exx tt enn tt    
prrre-- dett errrmiiinn ed...    IIInn    ss ome   Memberrr    SS tt att ess    iii tt    cann    be   ss eenn    ass    a   vv iiiolllatt iiionn    off    tt hh e   
prrr iiinn ciiipllle   off    ff rrree   colll lllectt iiivv e   barrrgaiiinn iiinn g...    TT hh errre   arrre   ss ome   ss chh olllarrrss    whh o   objjjectt    tt hh att    
tt hh iii ss    mett hh odolllogyy    off    a   mann datt orrryy    tt opiiicss    off    nn egott iiiatt iiionn ss ,,,    tt opiiicss    whh iiichh    muu ss tt    be   
covv errred   iiinn    orrrderrr    tt o   makk e   colll lllectt iiivv e   agrrreemenn tt ss    abllle   tt o   rrreplllace   lllegiii ss lllatt iiionn ,,,   tt hh iii ss    
lllogiiic   doess nn ’’ tt    llleavv e   tt hh e   barrrgaiiinn iiinn g   agenn tt ss    ann yy    lllonn gerrr    ff rrree   tt o   nn egott iiiatt e...    Ott hh errrss    
belll iiievv e   tt hh att ,,,    ass    lllabouu rrr    lllawyy errrss ,,,    we   ss hh ouu llld   diii ss cuu ss ss    tt hh iii ss    perrrss pectt iiivv e   ass    welll lll    ass    tt hh e   
quu ess tt iiionn    off    tt iiime   lll iiimiii tt ...    FF orrr    iiinn ss tt ann ce,,,    iiinn    tt hh e   cass e   off    tt hh e   EE uu rrropeann    Compann yy    
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barrrgaiiinn ,,,    yy ouu    arrre   iiinn vv iii tt ed   tt o   barrrgaiiinn    66    monn tt hh ss ,,,    nn o   lllonn gerrr ...    III ss    tt hh att    compatt iiibllle   wiii tt hh    
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paperrrss    iiinn    M...    BB iiiagiii ,,,    22 00 00 22 )) ...    
  
  
2.6 Concluding Remarks and Trends   
  
The importance of the ‘Quality factor’ in Community Industrial Relations 
was stressed for the first time at Lisbon in march 2000. The most important 
statement to come out of the Lisbon Council concerned the need to 
establish synergies and interdependency between economic policies, 
employment policies and social policies. Re-gaining full employment not 
only involves focusing on more jobs, but also on better jobs including 
equal opportunities for the disabled, gender equality, good and flexible 
work organisation permitting better reconciliation of working and 
personal life, lifelong learning, health and safety at work, employee 
involvement and diversity in working life. 
 
In this perspective the Stockholm European Council on 23 and 24 March 
2001 has invited Governments as well as the Council to define common 
approaches to maintaining and improving the quality of work which 
should be included as a general objective in the 2002 employment 
guidelines. The Stockholm European Council requested also the Council 
together with the Commission to develop indicators on quality in work, 
to be presented in time for the Laeken European Council in December 
2001.  
 
Following these suggestions the Commission has adopted a 
Communication on quality which includes a section on possible 
dimensions of quality in work and proposes possible indicators under 
those dimensions (see European Commission, 2001c). By promoting 
higher quality objectives, and by investing in better quality policies, the 
Commission ‘aims to encourage and assist the Member States improve 
the pace at which the quality of life is improved within the Union, inside 
and outside of work, and provide appropriate aspirations for candidate 
countries’. 
 
In its Social Policy Agenda, the Commission set the overall focus as the 
promotion of quality as the driving force for a thriving economy, more 
and better jobs and an inclusive society: 'extending the notion of quality 
- which is already familiar to the business world - to the whole of the 
economy and society [to] facilitate improving the inter-relationship 
between economic and social policies'. 
This Communication takes forward some of the key dimensions of the 
Social Policy Agenda, and some aims of the Lisbon strategy as 
reinforced by Nice and Stockholm, and provides a broad analytical 
basis and framework for the future. 
 
The focus on quality in the Social Policy Agenda is a means to underpin 
the modernisation of the European social model, to ensure the dynamic 
positive complementarity of economic and social policy, and so to meet 
the challenges of globalisation, enlargement and rapid technological, 
social and demographic change. The Nice Council conclusions stated 
that 'to meet these new challenges, the (Social Policy) Agenda must ... 
place the emphasis on the promotion of quality in all areas of social 
policy. Quality of training, quality in work, quality of industrial relations 
and quality of social policy as a whole are essential factors if the 
European Union is to achieve the goals it has set itself regarding 
competitiveness and full employment'. 
 
As the Social Policy Agenda states: 'quality of work includes better jobs 
and more balanced ways of combining working life with personal life. 
Quality of social policy implies a high level of social protection, good 
social services available to all people in Europe, real opportunities for all 
and the guarantee of fundamental and social rights. Good employment 
and social policies are needed to underpin productivity and to facilitate 
the adaptation to change. They also will play an essential role towards 
the full transition to the knowledge-based economy'.  
 
This approach is now confirmed by the European Council of Laeken 
(2001), where the Council has approved the report of the Employment 
Committee and the annex list of indicators (doc. 14263/01). However 
Presidency Conclusions are clear in specifying that the development of 
quality indicators is a process requiring a continuous 
adaptation/improvement according to the changes in data, policies 
and objectives. In this perspective the Council is launching an appeal for 
an integration between EES and Quality indicators 
 
From this point of view the 2002 EGLs proposed by the Commission and 
agreed in Laeken reflect some important innovations, in terms of 
methodology, as compared with the three previous years. Quality of 
work is now a strategic objective of the European Employment Strategy. 
It involves both the job characteristics amid the wider labour market 
context, and should be promoted trough actions across all the four 
pillars. In addition, new references to the quality aspect have been 
integrated in a number of relevant thematic guidelines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.    The ‘Quality Factor’ in  a Global Perspective 
 
3.1. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development  (OECD) 
 
The OECD Employment Outlook for 2001 tries to do an analysis of job 
quality based on specific indicators. In this perspective, the OECD 
underlines, a number of key findings emerging from the analysis of 
differences between the United States and Europe in employment 
performance and job quality (OECD, 2001). 
 
First, the higher overall employment rate in the United States than in 
Europe cannot be solely attributed to a surplus of low-paying service 
jobs. Second, while strong growth in service sector employment in the 
United States over the 1990s was accompanied by an expansion of low-
paying jobs, a larger expansion took place in jobs in relatively high-
paying occupations and industries. Third, Europe experienced slower 
growth in employment at all wage levels. While employment did grow 
fastest in high-paying jobs, as in the United States, the number of low-
paying jobs stagnated or declined. The configuration of policies that will 
be appropriate for each country in terms of addressing issues of job 
quality will depend on its initial situation. Countries with a relatively high 
incidence of jobs involving low pay and poor working conditions can 
provide income supplements for low-paid workers and can seek to 
reduce differences in entitlements between workers in typical and 
atypical jobs. Ultimately policies are required which encourage 
individuals and firms to invest more in skills acquisition. On the other hand, 
for countries wishing to improve their employment performance, the 
solution is not simply to stimulate job creation in poorly-paid service 
sector jobs but to implement a broad range of policies designed to 
stimulate employment more generally (OECD, 2001) 
 
There are a variety of ways to consider job quality and some 
methodological techniques can be useful to measure it. 
 
For example it is useful to make a distinction between the characteristics 
of persons performing a job and the characteristics of the job being 
performed or on the contractual arrangement. The chapter on services 
included a sectoral analysis of the characteristics of employed persons 
by age, gender and educational attainment. This chapter is mainly 
concerned with the characteristics of jobs as such. Of course, these two 
things are intimately related. The characteristics of a job will not just 
reflect the original configuration of the job as designated by the 
employer, but will also reflect the characteristics of the occupant. An 
employer may initially have a full-time job opening that may 
subsequently be transformed into a part-time job at the request of the 
eventual jobholder. Wages often rise the longer a person has been with 
an employer. This may not just reflect a simple seniority rule but the fact 
that the person’s job has effectively changed and embodies a higher 
level of skill as a result of learning by doing and/or other training 
investments. This interrelationship between the characteristics of workers 
and the characteristics of their job means that any measure of job 
quality needs to be interpreted with caution before a job can be 
classified as being either “bad” or “good”. For example, a part-time job 
may involve either a voluntary or involuntary choice and so in-and-of 
itself is neither a good nor a bad job (OECD, 2001). 
 
According to the OECD there is no single ideal measure, a range of both 
specific and more general measures is used in this chapter to build up a 
picture of how job quality varies across sectors and countries. The precise 
choice of measures has been guided by the constraint of choosing 
indicators that are widely available on a comparable basis across 
countries and at a detailed  sectoral level. The first set of specific 
measures that are reported concerns the incidence of part-time and 
temporary work, average job tenure and the incidence of training. This is 
followed by an analysis of various aspects of working conditions such as 
whether a job involves heavy lifting, is noisy or consists of repetitive tasks 
with little autonomy in the type or intensity of the work being done. More 
broad measures concern job satisfaction and how much a job pays. In 
each case, the empirical analysis is preceded by a brief discussion about 
the particular aspect of job quality that is being measured and the 
limitations of the relevant indicator (OECD, 2001). 
 
The rise in the number of “atypical” or “non-standard” jobs, such as part-
time and temporary jobs, has been of particular concern for several 
commentators who have seen this trend as a sign of a decline in job 
quality. But, as pointed out in  the OECD Employment Outlook from 1996 
to 2001 it is not always clear that part-time jobs are necessarily inferior to 
full-time jobs. Only a minority of all part-time workers appear to be 
working part-time on an involuntary basis, and, while part-time workers 
earn less on average than full-time workers in most countries, this can be 
partly accounted for by lower average skill levels. In the case of 
temporary jobs, they may serve as a useful entry point into more 
permanent work for younger and less-skilled workers. Nevertheless, some 
part-time and temporary jobs appear to be particularly badly paid and 
involve poor working conditions with limited career prospects. So it is of 
interest to see if whether these types of working arrangements tend to be 
concentrated in the same sectors in different countries and whether they 
are particularly prevalent in the  service sectors (OECD, 2001). 
 
In general, the incidence of part-time work is highest in personal services 
followed by social services. In several countries, part-time work 
accounted for more than one-third of all jobs in personal services in 1999 
(and just over one-half in the Netherlands). At a more detailed level, 
part-time work in many countries tends to be more common in domestic 
services followed by education, recreation and cultural services, hotels 
and restaurants, other personal and health services. The incidence of 
part-time work also tends to be relatively high in retail trade but this is 
offset within the distributive services by lower rates in wholesale trade 
and in transport and communication.  How well do these sectoral 
differences in the incidence of part-time work correlate with the rate of 
involuntary part-time work in each sector? Temporary jobs are more 
evenly spread across both the goods-producing and services sectors. 
Within the goods-producing sector, temporary work appears to be a 
particularly common form of work arrangement in the agricultural and 
construction, but somewhat less common in manufacturing. Within the 
services sector, the incidence of temporary work in the personal services 
sector is well above the national average in all countries. Within personal 
services, temporary work is a particularly common form of work 
arrangement in recreational and cultural services and in hotels and 
restaurants. It is also mostly above the national average in social services 
in most countries, boosted by a relatively high incidence in education, 
miscellaneous social services and health. As for part-time work, the 
incidence of temporary work also tends to be relatively high in retail 
trade, but somewhat lower in the other distributive services sectors 
(OECD, 2001). 
 
Interpreting these differences across sectors and countries is 
complicated by the fact that temporary employment potentially covers 
a range of different types of working arrangements. In addition to 
employment under a fixed-term contract, temporary employment can 
include seasonal and casual work and working under contract for a 
temporary work agency. These different types of arrangements may not 
all imply the same degree of precariousness. Moreover, countries differ in 
their coverage and definitions of these arrangements (OECD, 2001). 
 
 Another aspect of job quality concerns job stability as  indicated by 
average job tenure (OECD, 2001). This is typically measured by the 
length of time workers have been in their current jobs, and so refers to 
the continuation of employment in a job rather than to completed spells 
of tenure. There are a number of factors that suggest that there is 
probably a positive relationship between tenure and job quality. First, 
earnings tend to be positively correlated with average job tenure even 
after controlling for other factors affecting earning differentials. Second, 
involuntary job loss often entails a loss of earnings not only because of 
lost income during a period of unemployment but also because earnings 
may be subsequently lower in a new job (OECD, 2001). 
 
Therefore, all other things being equal, jobs with higher turnover rates will 
tend to be associated with greater job insecurity. But again, this indicator 
needs to be interpreted with caution (OECD, 2001). Not all short-tenure 
jobs reflect conditions that are imposed by employers, they can also 
reflect the preferences of jobholders themselves and may be 
compensated for by higher rates of pay (OECD, 2001). 
 
Sectoral differences in part-time and temporary work and in average job 
tenure partly reflect differences in the average characteristics of workers 
in each sector. For example, part-time work is considerably more 
common among women workers in general than among men, 
irrespective of the sector they each work in. Average tenure also tends 
to be lower for younger workers and women than for older workers and 
men. Therefore, it is of some interest to examine the extent to which job 
quality and worker characteristics are correlated across sectors (OECD, 
2001). 
 
The incidence of continuing vocational training provides a rough 
indicator of opportunities for career development and advancement. In 
fact, this is one of the few indicators of job quality where service jobs 
consistently come out ahead of jobs in the goods-producing sector. Part-
time work is much more prevalent in the  service sector than the goods-
producing sector, and yet there is evidence that part-time workers 
typically receive less training on average than full-time workers (OECD, 
2001). Average job tenure is also somewhat lower and job turnover 
higher in services than in goods production. Given that, all other things 
being equal, the advantages to firm specific training will be lower for an 
employer when labour turnover is relatively high, this would tend to lower 
the  prospects for training in the service sector relative to the goods-
producing sector. The fact that more training occurs per employee in the 
services sector than in the goods-producing sector suggests that the gap 
between the two sectors is probably even higher for workers with similar 
characteristics (OECD, 2001). 
 
The preceding analysis has relied on indirect measures of job quality. As 
an alternative to these indirect measures, more direct measures are 
provided by surveys of working conditions. In these types of surveys, 
jobholders are typically asked a number of questions about various 
aspects of their working conditions covering the work environment, the 
nature of the tasks performed in the job, the degree of job autonomy, 
and etc. These surveys can potentially provide a useful insight into 
differences across sectors in the types of job tasks being performed and 
whether they involve relatively poor or relatively good working 
conditions. However, it is not evident how to derive an aggregate 
measure of job quality from the potentially wide array of information on 
working conditions that is available. Moreover, not all countries have 
these types of surveys, and there can be large differences in the type of 
questions that are asked in those that do (OECD, 2001). 
 
 
3.2. International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
 
Relating to the quality of work, another important role is played by the 
ILO.  As underlined in the 1999 Report (ILO, 1999), during  the last two 
decades, the traditional cornerstones of ILO's activities have changed, 
shifted by the transformation of the economic and social environment 
brought about by the emerging global economy. Policies of economic 
liberalization have altered the relationship between the State, labour 
and business. Economic outcomes are now influenced more by market 
forces than by mediation through social actors, legal norms or State 
intervention. International capital markets have moved out of alignment 
with national labour markets, creating asymmetrical risks and benefits for 
capital and labour. There is a feeling that the "real" economy and the 
financial systems have lost touch with each other (ILO, 1999). 
 
Changes in employment patterns, labour markets and labour relations 
have had a profound impact on the ILO's constituents, particularly trade 
unions and employers' organizations. This is the main purpose of the ILO 
today. Decent work is the converging focus of all its four strategic 
objectives: the promotion of rights at work; employment; social 
protection; and social dialogue. It must guide its policies and define its 
international role in the near future (ILO, 1999). 
 
Such a goal has several important policy implications, all of which are 
implicit in the mandate of the Organization. They now need to be made 
explicit and to be pursued. The ILO Constitution calls for the 
improvement of the "conditions of labour", whether organized or not, 
and wherever work might occur, whether in the formal or the informal 
economy, whether at home, in the community or in the voluntary sector 
(ILO, 1999). 
 
The defence of rights at work necessarily involves the obligation to 
promote the possibilities of work itself. The ILO's normative function carries 
with it the responsibility to promote the personal capabilities and to 
expand the opportunities for people to find productive work and earn a 
decent livelihood. The ILO seeks to enlarge the world of work, not just to 
benchmark it. It is, therefore, as much concerned with the unemployed, 
and with policies to overcome unemployment and underemployment, 
as it is with the promotion of rights at work. An promotional environment 
for enterprise development lies at the heart of this objective (ILO, 1999). 
 
The goal is not just the creation of jobs, but the creation of jobs of 
acceptable quality. The quantity of employment cannot be divorced 
from its quality. All societies have a notion of decent work, but the quality 
of employment can mean many things. It could relate to different forms 
of work, and also to different conditions of work, as well as feelings of 
value and satisfaction. The need today is to devise social and economic 
systems which ensure basic security and employment while remaining 
capable of adaptation to rapidly changing circumstances in a highly 
competitive global market (ILO, 1999). 
 
 
3.3. The ‘Quality Factor’ in a World-wide Context: A Comparison between 
the USA, Japan, Russia, CEECs and the EU 
 
3.3.1. Preliminary Remarks 
 
With the increased number of types and conditions of work, there is an 
increased need for diversified methods of labour-management relations. 
Companies offering more flexibility to their workers can lead to increased 
levels of production because of the workers’ contentedness, but it can 
pose monitoring problems for management. Also, with the downsizing 
and subcontracting of employees, enterprise management has a 
smaller pool of workers to directly manage, but the increased number of 
temporary workers does not allow for bargaining on a firm, or sometimes 
even an industry-wide level. Tele-work offers many more flexible 
scenarios for workers, but the types that seem to be gaining popularity 
call for independence on the worker’s behalf and less interaction with 
management, however, management needs to be able to set-up a very 
organized system for its tele-workers. The conflict between allowing for 
flexibility in the workplace, while maintaining solidarity is a large 
challenge for social parties today. Again, with employees’ increased 
demand for flexibility, there is inevitably the need for the change in 
methods of agreement and labour-relations to counter balance the 
changes in employment. 
 
New trends in the labour market will be conducive to less linear careers 
and more discontinuous employment situations, employability will have 
to be managed by industrial relations (training, early retirement, 
professional breaks for family reasons, etc.). In terms of quality the key will 
be to promote adaptability. 
 
Regarding flexibility in employment the literature discusses the role of 
culture against the installation of various types of flexible work into the 
workplace. Country factors have to be looked at in combination with 
cultural factors for an employer to decide which types of flexibility will 
best suit the company. Goals of the given set of employees is also 
important, because the employer’s concern for employees could lead 
to increased performance levels.  Ultimately, globalisation strategies 
could be developed by studying national domestic values. 
 
Uncertainty avoidance- the culture feels threatened by uncertain or 
unknown situations 
 
• High levels: utilize shift work and contractual employment 
• Low levels: temporary work, P/T work, telework, although 
performance monitoring problems may be encountered.  
 
Power Distance- When less powerful members except that power is 
unequal, leading to a decrease of participation and an increase in the 
perceived importance of status 
 
• High: Greater shift work, to help maintain authority 
• Low: Temporary work, contracts, P/T work, and telework can help 
limit the time of direct supervision 
 
Individualism vs. Collectivism- The expectation of people to look after 
themselves versus the desire to be integrated and work in cohesive 
groups 
  
• High Individualism: temporary work, contract work, P/T work, 
tele-work 
• High Collectivism:  shift work  
 
Masculinity vs. Femininity- Masculine culture is concerned with earnings, 
recognition, advancement, and challenging work. Femininity has a 
greater need for good relationships with supervisors, co-operation, 
quality of life, and job security 
  
• Masc: Temporary work, contract work, and shift work 
• Fem: P/T work, telework 
 
Subcontracting/Contracting-out & New Forms of Employment. The 
decline of the “Fordist” enterprise has led to the decrease of 
employment relations and social dialogue in labour relations. Other 
factors  include the increased demand for the differentiation of products 
and technology advances. Also, the focus of businesses has become 
more oriented on the central core (design and marketing aspects), and 
subcontracting and contracting-out sectors of the business such as 
manufacturing, transport and IT management have been implemented. 
 
Social constraints of a company can lead to subcontracting, such as 
uneven periods of necessary employment. By only contracting the 
minimum number of full time employees, the company can seek 
subcontracted employment during temporary needs. 
 
Downsizing permanent employees allows a company to employ 
subcontracted workers at low cost, and increase their ability to respond 
to market trends. 
Effects: 
1) Cascade subcontracting- growing number of unstable 
workforce 
2) Restricts the amount of representative activity for the workforce, 
social dialogue is almost lost, decreased scope of industry-wide 
dialogue, and collective agreements 
3) Short contracts are re-negotiated more frequently leading to 
more competition 
4) Imposed P/T and fixed contracts decreases solidarity between 
industry and employees; workers identify as a network, and 
sometimes set up their own business 
 
Competition of labour also leads to subcontracting and contracting-out: 
 
1) local subcontracting to atypical employment- such as self-
employment, family employment (less control of labour). 
2) Relocation to countries where wages are lower. 
  
3) Clandestine employment- (sectors that cannot be transferred) 
lead to decreased production costs, but an increased number 
of workers are not willing to work for low wages. 
 
 
3.3.2. Japan 
 
All over the world full time employment is becoming scarce, women are 
finding themselves in more authoritative positions, and the role of trade 
unions is becoming questionable. These factors have all had particularly 
significant implications for Japan. In the land of the rising sun, downsizing 
has caused some to take their lives, women are putting off marriage and 
having fewer children. The population is increasingly growing older (Y. 
Morito, 2000a, 25 et seqq.). 
 
In the past, the Japanese have been known for their work ethic. An 
employee gave total loyalty toward his or her firm and could expect life-
time employment in return. Graduates were hired directly from 
universities and could expect to spend their entire career within a single 
organization. Prestige was not based on the type of work done but the 
company in which an individual was employed. Under the loyalty for life-
time employment system, promotions and pay raises happened 
automatically over a period of time (see, among the others; J.C. 
Abegglen, 1958; M. Aoki, 1984; N. J. Chalmers, 1989; R.P. Dore, 1973; K. 
Koike, 1988; Y. Suwa, 1991, 4 et seqq.). Recently, however, waves of 
economic crises have swept through Asia and Japan has not been 
spared. Now life-time employment is no longer feasible and such 
positions are being cut all over Japan. These cuts have hit middle- aged 
men, not far from retirement, particularly hard. Many would ask where 
the trade unions have been throughout this time (see: Y. Morito, S. Ouchi,  
2000c, 217-230). 
 
The Japanese Employment System of employment is traditionally characterized 
by three factors: long-term employment, internal development of work-related 
skills, and evaluation and reward based on the degree to which employees 
develop these skills. The logic behind this combination is two-fold: firstly, that 
with the relatively long-term attachment of employees to firms, firms can safely 
invest in human capital formation; and secondly, that with a system where 
evaluation and reward are based on skill and competence development, 
employees are motivated to learn and upgrade their skills. The contribution of 
this human resource strategy —called “internalization of human resources” — to 
the strength of large Japanese manufacturing firms has been extensively 
documented in numeroses studies. 
It is also well known that “internalization” policy has not been available to the 
entire Japanese workforce, and within most organizations it has in fact been 
restricted to the core or “regular-status” (seiki koy-o j-ugy-oin) employee groups. 
Alongside these regular-status employees, a significant number of workers 
classified as “non-regular” or “contingent” workers have always existed in the 
Japanese labor market. These workers are hired not for regular long-term 
employment but for non-regular employment that is often characterized by 
such conditions as shorter working time, fixed term or temporary contracts, or 
an employment relationship with a third party.  
 
During the past decade, employers in Japan have increasingly been 
using contingent workers. The contingent share of the labor force has 
increased by a ratio of 1.6 from 1988 to 1998 as firms have experimented 
with alternative types of employment (and non-employment) to cope 
with a severe economic recession and a concomitant surplus of core 
employees (Y. Morito, S. Ouchi,  2000c). Based on the Ministry of Labour 
statistics (http://www.jil.go.jp), it is possible estimates that the proportion 
of contingent workers in the total labor force was about 25 percent in 
2000. However, according to unofficial data the proportion of 
contingent or non-regular employees is estimated to be about 40 
percent of labour force. In any case, the rate of growth of contingent 
employment was faster than that of total employment during the 1980s 
and 1990s. Such a trend is sometimes called “externalization of 
employment” in Japan, in contrast to the internalization employment 
policy mentioned earlier.  
 
In Japan, the term “contingent worker” goes far beyond “part-time” 
workers whose category is defined by shorter working hours (35 hours or 
fewer according to the definition of “part-time” in Japan). All non-
regular workers whose jobs do not provide full-time, indefinite duration 
(long-term) employment with the same employer are categorized as 
contingent (Y. Morito, S. Ouchi, 2000c). Some of these workers are not 
even directly employed by the organizations that provide their jobs. They 
are, in fact, employed by temporary agencies or firms that have business 
contracts with those organizations. In the literature, contingent 
employment (to use the most widely accepted label) is a loosely defined 
category that includes a wide variety of workers:  
 
• temporary workers hired directly by the employer  
• contract company (subcontractor) workers  
• workers hired through a temporary-help agency (and who, legally, 
are not employees of the employer at whose location they work, 
but of the agency), and  
• a large and diverse category of self-employed individuals (such as 
solo consultants, independent contractors).  
 
One important difference between regular and non-regular or 
contingent workers is the degree to which their employment is flexible (Y. 
Morito, S. Ouchi,  2000c). With regard to regular-status employees, 
employment status is strongly protected, both by a legal framework that 
provides employment contracts of unlimited duration and by employer 
practices that are sometimes labeled as “life-time employment.” In 
contrast, such strong protection is never extended to non-regular or 
contingent employees. Due to the legal framework that sharply 
separates regular-status workers from the rest of the workers, the 
demarcation between the two is much clearer in Japanese labor 
markets than those in other countries. The likelihood that these 
contingent workers provide firms with higher staffing flexibility and 
reduction in labor cost is, therefore, particularly strong in Japan, and 
possibly stronger than in European countries.  
 
More specifically, a Japanese Institute for Labour survey conducted in 
1999 used the following framework to categorize contingent or 
“externalized” workers (http://www.jil.go.jp). In their definition, workers 
may be classified as: 1) regular-status employees, 2) shukk-o employees 
(employees transferred to firms within corporate groups or to related 
firms), 3) part-time employees, 4) limited-term contract employees, 5) 
“dispatch” workers hired through temporary agency firms, and 6) internal 
contract workers (workers who are employees of firms that have business 
relationships to the firms where they work). Workers in Categories 5 and 6 
are not employees of the firms where they conduct their work. Shukk-o 
employees are usually regular-status workers, but have their formal 
employment relationship with the firms that have sent them to their 
current place of work. According to the survey by the Japanese Institute 
for Labour regular-status employees existed in almost all establishments 
(98.8%), and 25.7 percent of establishments had shukk-o employees. With 
regard to non-regular workers, 56.1 percent and 27.2 percent had part-
time and limited-contract employees, respectively. Some firms (13.4%) 
described themselves as having other types of non-regular workers with 
whom they had some form of employment relationship. In addition, 18.1 
percent of the establishments stated that they had dispatch workers 
hired through temporary help agencies. Another 17.2 percent of the 
firms used internal contract workers. Thus, more than half of the 
employers used part-time employees and approximately 20 to 30 
percent of the employers used limited-term contracts and dispatch 
workers.  
 
The effectiveness of the Japanese human resource management system 
has relied heavily on workplace morale and the attachment that 
employees show toward their employing organizations, and this, in turn, 
has often been attributed to Japanese employment practices such as 
long-term employment, internal training, and rewards based on skill 
development. The departure from these practices, with the shift towards 
the increased use of contingent workers, may send a signal to regular-
status employees that their jobs could be converted into contingent 
positions. Employees may also conclude that their efforts to learn and to 
upgrade their skills will not be rewarded in the long run, and they may 
show less willingness to learn firm-specific skills that are valuable only to 
their current employers. It can therefore be hypothesized that the 
increased use of contingent employees would cause regular-status 
employees to decrease their attachment to the workplace, and would 
have negative consequences on workplace morale.  
 
As far as the quality of work for contingent employees is concearned an 
increasing number of lawsuits involving the termination of fixed-term 
employment contracts have come before the courts as a result of 
restructuring in the private sector (Y. Suwa, 1991, 4 et seqq.). To deal with 
this matter, a study group was established within the Ministry of Labour to 
survey the situation (http://www.jil.go.jp). A questionnaire administered in 
September 2000 yielded the following results.  
 
• About 70 percent of all firms surveyed employed workers on a 
fixed-term contract. Among these firms, “part-timers” and 
“contract workers” accounted for some 60 percent of all fixed-
term employees, and “temporary workers” and “workers under 
other types of fixed-term employment contract” accounted for 
another 14-15 percent. About 40 percent of all workers hired under 
fixed-term labor contracts were engaged in “clerical jobs,” and 
women accounted for about two-thirds of these employees.  
• A relatively high proportion of firms cited “reduction in labor costs” 
as the reason for hiring employees with fixed-term contracts. 
About 70 percent of firms indicated this as the reason for hiring 
part-timers; about 40 percent for temporary workers, about 30 
percent for “contract workers,” and about 30 percent for other 
types of fixed-term employees. However, there was some 
difference according to the contract type: 40 percent of firms 
hiring part-timers and about 60 percent of those hiring temporary 
workers replied that they did so “to cope with changes in the work 
load.” About 50 percent of firms hiring contracted workers said 
they did so “to make use of their specialized abilities and 
experience.”  
• Many fixed-term employees cited the reasons for working on a 
fixed-term contract basis as “convenience of workplace” (about 
40%), or “the desire to earn extra income to support their families” 
(about 30%). However, the highest proportion (40%) of “contract 
workers” surveyed indicated that they chose their current work 
status and job “to make use of their experience.” About 40 
percent of part-timers who actually work long hours claimed that 
they had been “unable to find regular employment.”  
• Concerning contract periods, the majority of employees on all 
types of fixed-term contracts had been hired for “more than six 
months but less than one year.” A high proportion (about 77%) of 
“contract workers” are employed for such periods. In addition, 
about 66 percent of workers wished that their contracts would be 
renewed after termination of their current contract.  
• Concerning the renewal of contracts, firms conclude all types of 
fixed-term contracts with the understanding that there is a 
possibility most of the contracts would be renewed. However, the 
survey found that in about 10 percent of the establishments 
surveyed, the firm's explanation differed from the workers' actual 
situations. The survey also found that some 10 percent of workers 
did not receive an explicit explanation about renewal when 
agreeing to their labor contract. Also, nearly 10 percent of the 
establishments did not give employees with fixed-term contracts 
30 days' advance notice when they terminated employment. In 
this regard, some 60 percent of workers who have in the past 
failed to have their contracts renewed felt dissatisfied with the 
termination of their contracts. This seems to reflect the fact that 
firms and workers have a different set of assumptions or 
understandings with regard to the termination of employment. 
About half the firms which had terminated a labor contract  cited 
“poor performance or an inappropriate attitude on the part of the 
worker involved” as the reason for dismissal. By way of contrast, 50 
percent of workers who had experienced termination of 
employment said that the reason they were given was simply 
“termination of contract period,” while another 30 percent had 
been told that the termination was due to the “deterioration of the 
company's business performance.” It seems likely that 
dissatisfaction among workers arises from a situation where workers 
expected their contract normally to be renewed whereas 
companies did not necessarily consider the relationship to be so 
lasting.  
 
Together with these results, the survey pointed to the importance of 
preventing in advance trouble concerning fixed-term labor contracts. 
The report stressed the need to provide both workers and employers with 
information, including court case studies, regarding matters on 
employment relations as they relate to fixed-term contracts, and to give 
advice and guidance when trouble arises. 
 
Meanwhile, women are gaining influence in the workplace. Traditionally,  
they would leave employment when married. This is no longer the case. 
They are remaining employed after marriage, putting off marriage, and 
having fewer children. All these factors combined have resulted in the 
following social problems:  
 
• rising unemployment  
• more people committing suicide and becoming homeless.  
• a steadily aging population  
 
Japan clearly does not have the social mechanisms in place to deal 
with these problems (see Y. Morito, 2000b). Unemployment benefits are 
of menial importance and are no longer paid after 90-300 days of 
unemployment.  Unemployment agencies are of little help. They are only 
successful in finding employment for a small percentage of those taking 
advantage of their services.  Those who benefit tend to be the young as 
many Japanese firms are reluctant to hire older, more costly, employees 
who have been “groomed for employment” in another organization. 
Also many Japanese firms are not prepared for the entry of women into 
the workplace. Mothers simply cannot get leave they need to have 
children and care for young.  Women fear that having children will 
negatively impact their prospects for advancement.  Childcare in Japan 
is lacking at best.  Children enter the day care system at younger ages 
and remain away from home for longer periods of time. “Baby Hotels” 
are becoming more popular where children actually spend the night 
because parents do not have the time to take the home.  This has had a 
severe impact on Japanese youth.  Many do not place the same value 
on hard work as previous generations.  For these reasons, many women 
choose to put off marriage and wish to have fewer children.   
 
Due to economic hardship and corresponding social problems, Japan 
finds itself in a situation where it must find creative solutions to difficult 
problems.  Here is Japan’s response to a changing environment:    
 
• Occupation therapy  
• Holding liable for employees who commit suicide or die from 
overwork 
• Encouraging women to start families 
• Delaying of management  
• Shutdowns instead of layoffs  
• Revamping wage systems within firms 
• Part time employment  
 
All things considered, Japan is slowly adapting to the new economy (see 
Y. Morito, 2000b). Economic crisis has forced firms to restructure and life-
time employment is no longer a reality.  Redundancy has been the 
greatest cause for headache among employees and has prompted 
some to commit suicide.  Many firms are discovering that lay offs are not 
the only solution, however, and recent alternatives have succeeded in 
keeping the unemployment rate below 5%. Unfortunately there is still 
work to be done. Women have entered the workforce and are there to 
stay.  Family friendly policies must be adopted so women do not have to 
choose between their families and their jobs. 
 
 
 
3.3.3. US 
 
In the US while the economy has had fairly strong job growth and low 
unemployment rates recently, poverty rates remain high. Welfare reform, 
which is forcing more people to compete for jobs at the bottom of the 
labour market, is making this problem even worse. Research in several 
states has quantified a ‘jobs gap’: the difference between the number 
of job seekers and the number of available jobs paying a living wage 
(see: S.N. Houseman, 1996; C.W. Summers,  1997, 503 et seqq.).  
 
One of the most striking changes in recent years has been the explosion 
of part-time work, on-call job, free-lance and other workers. Collectively 
known as "contingent" workers because they work under terms that differ 
from regular full-time employment, they constitute the fastest growing 
segment of the labour market. As many as 40 million Americans now 
work under such arrangements (S.N. Houseman, 1996; C. Tilly, 1995,  269 
et seqq.). 
 
One of the most pressing questions facing researchers and policy makers 
today is how economic restructuring has affected the nature of work in 
America (K.G. Abraham, 1990, 85 et seqq.). The nature of competition 
and product markets, the structure of workplaces, and attachments to 
employers all look very different now than they did at the height of 
industrial capitalism. There is a growing sense that the environment in 
which firms make choices and pursue competitive strategies has shifted, 
and that trends in the labour market and wage inequality are part of an 
unfolding system of industrial relations. Compared to the post-war period, 
the American employment relationship appears to be changing – in how 
the workplace is organized, in how workers are matched with jobs, and 
in how wages and the terms of employment are set (S.N. Houseman, 
1996). 
 
The business press abounds with examples of innovative companies that 
have created high quality and well-paid jobs; yet just as prevalent are 
accounts of low-wage strategies, deskilled jobs, the imposition of two-
tiered wage systems, and substitution of contingent for full-time workers 
(S.N. Houseman, 1996). 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s researchers began documenting stagnant wages 
and an unprecedented rise and  wage inequalities (R.S. Belous, 1989.). 
The situation was becoming especially alarming for parts of the black 
and Hispanic population, whose poverty rates were increasing and 
whose labour force participation was decreasing. To varying degrees, 
these trends continue to the present despite a strong economy and tight 
labour market. To explain increasing inequality, researchers have turned 
primarily to the roles of technology and skill. Workers with a college 
degree saw growth in their real wages, while those with less education 
saw stagnation and even decline. Therefore, the prevailing argument in 
both public and academic spheres is that skill has become more 
important in the American labour market and that it has been driven by 
rapid technological change, in particular the broad influx of information 
technology into the workplace. While this is an intuitively appealing and 
parsimonious account of the rise in economic inequality, it does not by 
itself suffice. The growing gap between those with high and those with 
low levels of education explains at best half of the total increase in wage 
inequality. There is a substantial residual increase that has occurred 
within groups of workers of the same age, education, and experience, 
and this residual has so far not been explained (K. Hughes et al., 1999).  
 
Although job growth in the U.S. economy has been generally strong over 
the last decade, many have argued that the "quality" of the jobs being 
generated is low, where quality refers to the pay and benefits of the job 
(J.P. Hiatt et al.,  L, 1994, 143 et seqq.). On the surface this argument 
would appear to have some merit. The U.S. economy has undergone 
dramatic structural transformation with a fall in the proportion of 
employment in the high-paying goods- producing sector and a rise in 
the proportional of employment in the low-paying services sector. The 
share of employment in manufacturing was 28.7 percent in 1969, 23.4 
percent in 1979, 17.9 percent in 1989, and 16.2 percent in 1993. Both the 
absolute increase and the share increase in employment have been 
greatest in the service sector. The share of employment in services rose 
from 15.8 percent in 1969, to 19.1 percent in 1979, to 25.0 percent in 
1989, to 27.4 percent in 1993 (S.N. Houseman, 1996; C. Tilly, 1995,  269 et 
seqq.). 
 
A study by Bluestone and Harrison (Bluestone et al, 1986) prepared for 
the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress was the first to 
explicitly question the quality of the jobs being created in the U.S. 
economy in the 1980's. That study examined job growth during the 1979-
84 period. Using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), the 
authors tabulated the earnings distribution of net new employment 
generated over the period according to a classification of annual 
earnings into low, medium, and high earnings categories; medium 
earnings in this study were defined as lying, in real terms, between 50 
percent and 200 percent of median earnings in 1973. Bluestone and 
Harrison found that the proportion of workers in middle- and high-wage 
jobs fell, while the proportion of workers in low-wage jobs rose over the 
1979-84 period. 
 
Several studies have tried to better measure the quality, as indicated by 
wages, of net new jobs created in the economy. To do so, these studies 
ordered detailed industries or occupations according to the mean or 
median wage paid at a point in time — the end point in the study — and 
examined changes in the distribution of employment by industry or 
occupation between two points in time. Because industries or 
occupations receive the same ordering in the two points in time, the 
analysis is unaffected by changes in the wages paid by an industry over 
time. It should be noted, however, that these studies can only tell us 
whether, employment is being  increased in high-paying or low-paying 
industries or occupations. We do not have data that would permit us to 
tell whether the new jobs themselves are high or low paying (see S.N. 
Houseman, 1996). 
 
During the 1990s, the hallmark features of the labour market, including 
long-term mutual between the firm and worker, have been fading. There 
is a good deal of disagreement not only about the extent of the 
changes in employment arrangements, but about their advantages and 
disadvantages for workers, employers and the economy.  
 
Relating to this new US labour system, it is possible to make some general 
remarks:  
 
• Employers rather than employees favour non-standard work 
arrangements.  
 
• As measured by wages, productivity, legal risks and ease of 
discharge, non-standard "flexible" work benefits employers. These 
benefits, however, have not so far been translated into a 
measurable increase in employer earnings.  
 
• Not all non-standard jobs are of poor quality. In particular, older 
men who are self-employed generally earn more than men doing 
similar work in regular full-time jobs.  
 
• An important predictor of non-standard workers worker earnings is 
education. Well-educated contingent workers are typically well 
paid, but they do not generally receive the same level of health 
insurance and retirement benefits as regular full-time employees.  
 
• Gender and race heavily affect the earnings of contingent 
workers. Unmarried, less educated, black women who live in the 
are among the most rapidly increasingly market for non-standard 
jobs -- and the most poorly paid relative to full-time standard 
employment.  
 
Relating to this topic we have to consider that one of the most notable 
transformations in the US labour market since World War II has been the 
rising share of employment in the service sector and the declining share 
in the manufacturing sector. Scholars have tried to determine if this shift 
from manufacturing industry to the service sector affect the quality of 
employment in the United States. Because average wages are higher in 
manufacturing than in services, some observers view the employment 
shifts as generally representing a shift from ‘good’ to ‘bad’ jobs (C. Tilly, 
1995).  
 
Beyond comparisons of average pay, there are many other elements of 
job quality. A comprehensive assessment of these elements reveals that 
the services industry is very diverse in terms of job quality, and many jobs 
in the industry compare favourably with those in manufacturing and 
other industries. While workers in services generally are less likely than 
those in manufacturing to receive employer-provided health, retirement, 
and disability benefits, in several large segments of the service sector - 
especially hospitals and private education - workers have high rates of 
benefit coverage. Moreover, workers in the service sector are much less 
likely to lose their jobs than are those in manufacturing, and work-related 
injuries, illnesses, and death are far less common in the service sector 
than in other industries.     
 
Every job has a number of characteristics that could be considered 
when evaluating the job’s quality or desirability. For example, what does 
the job pay? What benefits are provided? How secure is the job? What 
kind of work does it entail? What is the risk of injury or death on the job? 
Are there opportunities for advancement? Does the job require a lot of 
travel? These are just some of the questions that a worker would ask 
when deciding whether to choose a particular job. Researchers might 
ask many of these same questions when assessing the quality of groups 
of jobs, but finding the answers is somewhat more complicated. 
 
As we said, some observers have pointed to the growth in part-time, or 
temporary, contracts, and other atypical forms of employment as 
evidence of a decline in the quality of jobs in the U.S. economy  (C.W. 
Summers, 1997, 503 et seqq.). It is argued that many part-time, 
temporary, and contract workers, sometimes through no choice of their 
own, are part of a "contingent" workforce characterized by low wages, 
few benefits, and little job security  (J.P. Hiatt et al., 1994). The growth in 
these forms of employment may simply be caused by supply-side forces, 
reflecting worker demands for shorter hours and more flexible terms of 
employment. Evidence suggests, however, increased employer 
demands for part-time workers may also be responsible for the increase 
of this type of employment.  Many have noted that because virtually all 
of the increases in part-time employment in recent years may be 
attributed to the increase in involuntary part-time employment, the rise in 
part-time employment must reflect demand and not supply-side forces. 
 
Little in the way of data on temporary employment in the United States 
exists. The most widely cited statistics on temporary employment come 
from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics's monthly establishment survey on 
employment in the help supply service industry. Most employment in this 
industry is  through temporary help agencies. Although employment in 
the help supply service industry is relatively small, it has grown rapidly in 
recent years, increasing from 0.5 percent of nonfarm payroll 
employment in 1982 to 1.5 percent in 1993. Golden and Appelbaum 
have examined the determinants of the growth of employment in the 
temporary employment sector in the United States and conclude that 
forces affecting employer demand rather than forces affecting 
household supply are more important in explaining the increase of 
employment in the temporary help sector (L. Golden et al., 1993, 473-
494).   
 
Since the 1970's net new jobs have been disproportionately created in 
low-wage industries, but they have been disproportionately created in 
high-wage occupations. Moderate growth in the share of employment 
in part-time and temporary jobs, which tend to have low wages, few 
benefits, and little job security, provides some evidence of deteriorating 
job quality (See particularly L. Golden, 1994).  
  
Another undisputed fact about the U.S. labour force is that people who 
already have jobs sometimes decide to look for “better” jobs. However, 
each potential jobseeker determines his or her own criteria for defining 
“better,” and that definition may change as the individual’s 
circumstances change. (See recently J. Meisenheimer II et al., 2000, 3 et 
seqq.).    
 
Job-search rates for contingent workers generally did not decline 
substantially with age as they did for full time workers. This pattern 
suggests that workers who had jobs they considered insecure were likely 
to look for new jobs regardless of their age. It seems somewhat surprising 
that the rate was not higher, given that contingent workers, by definition, 
perceive their jobs as insecure. With the rapid job growth and falling 
unemployment in the United States during the 1995–99 period, many 
contingent workers might have believed that they could wait until their 
jobs ended before seeking new ones. In addition, some contingent 
workers might have just started their temporary employment 
arrangements at the time they were surveyed and, thus, might not yet 
have been ready to look for new jobs. With future data, researchers 
could determine whether contingent workers are more likely to look for a 
new job during recessions, when workers might be less confident that 
they will be able to find a new job quickly after their contingent job ends 
(A.E. Polivka,  1996, 3 et seqq.; K.D. Henson, 1996.). 
 
Effects of  tight market- Recruitment, and Retention Policies  
 
• Small and medium sized firms face a hiring difficulties,  
 
• Tapping into new sources of labour 
 Seeking welfare recipients, reformed ex-convicts, students 
• Competitive recruiting, variable compensation, diversity, and 
management 
Companies offer performance-related pay, year-end 
bonuses, extended contracts 
 
Companies have to expand to integrate women, aged and young 
workers, and other more diverse employees into the workplace. By 
becoming more diverse they also become more attractive working 
environments. HR recruiters also need: high quality, timely recruitment, 
informative materials, fair selection processes, a good company image, 
good competitive packages and rewarding jobs with potential for 
growth to offer  recruits.   
 
To retain employees once they are hired employers should provide: 
opportunities for satisfying work, fair management, appreciation for 
employees and a concern for employee well-being, competitive pay 
and benefits, and opportunities for advancement. 
 
Variable pay can be used as incentives to employees without increasing 
the base salary. Stock options are also becoming popular (aka “broad 
based option plans” or BBOPs), because they can link employee 
compensation with firm performance. 
Management can utilize HR to gain a competitive advantage in the 
market or specific sector of the market economy. Some managers 
choose to outsource their HR management for reasons of efficiency, 
uncertainty, firm size, and cost. 
  
 
• A tight market has the capability of giving more power to the 
worker 
• Job stability and security are decreased, as job-hopping becomes 
the norm,  
(hot desking and telecommuting; loss of jobs after tenure) 
• Laws guaranteeing job protection are growing more costly- High 
unemployment rates in Europe, but it  is also difficult to hire and fire 
workers. U.S.- “accept that we have to sack you and, in 
exchange, we will make sure that you have the marketable skills 
needed to find another job.” 
 
 
Declining Unemployment rate; Wages and Inflation 
 
The “misery index” that looks at the combination of the unemployment 
rate and the rate of inflation, has been at an all time low.  Meaning that 
with more people hired, wages might also increase to accommodate 
the near full-employment, thus, driving prices up. However, three factors 
discuss why this isn’t the case. 
 
1) Increased price competition on a global level, lax entry-barriers, 
and shrinking economies of scale 
2) “Value-added” products increase in value via design, style, 
advertising and marketing schemes, but the price  will not 
inflate at a high rate  
3) Employer-provided healthcare is increasing at a rate slower 
than inflation, so more employee healthcare costs are being 
paid for by the employee 
 
Increased Flexibility vs. Decreased Job Security 
 
As we have discussed before, management can save money by hiring 
less of their staff on a full-time contract. However, it is argued that part-
time and contractual work offers individuals more flexible work options. In 
these cases, the unions were victorious. 
UPS Case- American Teamsters fighting against UPS for use of part-timers, 
Teamsters won  BOEING Co. Vs. Internat’l Assoc. of Machinists (IAM) – 
Increased over-time pay  (7 day work week, 12 hour shifts) for some 
workers, and laying off the rest (downsizing and/ or outsourcing jobs). 
Union workers are looking for job security, tighter outsourcing rules, a 
union seat on the board of directors, and less forced overtime. 
Outcome- Boeing began offering education and retraining programs for 
workers who were displaced by outsourcing or waved in production 
needs. 
 
Given the growing sectors of the service and technology economies, the 
role of unions in America is likely to change, or they will have to change 
internally to accommodate  growing labour needs.  As the labour 
market remains tight, there will be a continuation of increasing diversity in 
the workplace, thus, giving accepting and inclusive employers an 
advantage in seeking and retaining workers. On the labour end, 
adaptability and training will be key in  finding employment in the U.S., 
while individualism is still first and foremost in the private sector. However, 
with such a tight labour market, industrial power can shift to the hands of 
the labour force. Currently with a low unemployment rate, and without 
heavy inflation, the United States is in a favourable economic situation, 
but it seems unlikely that this will last. And given the factors that are 
keeping the misery index low, it is illustrated that overall wage increases is 
are not as drastic as they seem with the transferral of employee benefits, 
such as healthcare, to the burden of the employee.  
 
 
3.3.4. Russia and CEECs countries  
 
The transition from a centralised economy based on top-down, pyramid 
methods to an economy based on market forces is a very difficult and 
long process linked with the fall in industrial output and great economic 
problems. The degree of waste and inefficiency has proved greater than 
anticipated. Mr. Dennis Skinner, Midland Bank representative in Moscow 
in 1884, at that time described the Soviet-style economy as ‘a giant 
cartwheel with a powerful rim, hub and spokes’. Millions of workers in 
what had been secure jobs were sacked, entire industries and company 
towns have closed or have stockpiled unwanted goods, failed to pay 
wages and run up impossible debts. The degree of waste and 
inefficiency in planned economies has proved greater than anticipated. 
In particular, the ex- soviet republics (Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Russia and 
others) suffered because here output was concentrated in military or 
related sectors (Strategy Paper,  1999).  
 
A new institution, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, was set up to facilitate the transitions. Fundamental 
principals were rediscovered. The most important principle was the 
crucial role of private ownership and the linkage between legality, 
democracy and prosperity. The communist state began by seizing 
private property. The restitution of private property and privatisation of 
state-owned assets have been at the heart of the transition to a law –
based, multi-party market economy and society (M. Ladò, 2002). 
 
The private sector in most other central European States now constitutes 
between 40-65 %. Privatisation has never before taken place on such a 
scale and at such frantic speed.  Millions of jobs have been created in 
trade, services and private enterprises. But it didn’t contribute greatly to 
resolve the internal problems such as unemployment, low wages, and 
the lack of qualified specialists in certain sectors and others. The gap 
between very rich and very poor people increased to a great extent 
(ESC, 2001; H. Kohl et al., 2001). 
 
It is clear that the painful transition underway in the CEEs countries has 
some way to go before completion. But after the slowdown of the late 
1990s, there are welcome signs of economic recovery. The aggregate 
GDP trends suggest the region is emerging from the problems caused by 
the Russian crisis in 1999 and the Kosovo war. GDP growth in the CEECs 
overall accelerated from 2,2% in 1999 to approximately 4% in 2000. 
Similar growth is expected in 2001 and 2002.  There remains, however, 
large differences between countries with some record growth of over 5% 
in 2000. Despite improved growth, employment continued to 
deteriorate, falling to 1.4% in the region overall, although the rate of 
decline appears to have slowed in the later part of 2000. unemployment 
continued to rise in most countries and exceeded 14% in Poland, 
Slovakia, Bulgaria and the Baltic countries. Compared to the EU, the 
CEECs have an over-dependence on agriculture for employment and 
while employment in industry is close to the EU average, it is particularly 
under-developed in the service sector (European Commission 2001b, 93).   
 
Most of the CEECs have higher male than female unemployment with 
the male/female gap being greatest in the Baltic countries. Youth 
unemployment across the region was over 26% in 2000, compared to 
16% in the EU, with Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia recording rates in 
excess of 35% (European Commission, 2001b, 93).    
 
The transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe have already  
undergone substantial transformation, and this process continues to 
have major implications for employment and the labour market. 
Generally, different skills are now in demand, and some sectors are 
growing healthily while there have been large-scale job-losses in others, 
and unemployment is high. Having fallen from 3,5% in 1997 to 2,6% in 
1998, GDP growth in the CEECs overall slowed further, to 2,2,% in 1999. 
Recovery from this slowdown began as early as mid-1999 in some 
countries, and overall GDP growth for the CEECs in 2000 is estimated at 
4,0%. As it was mentioned above, similar growth is forecast for 2001 and 
2002 (European Commission, 2001b, 93). 
 
Despite the growth turnaround, the area overall saw a continued 
deterioration in employment in 2000  - only Hungary  and Slovenia had 
higher employment levels in 2000 than in 1999. The pace of employment 
decline slowed in Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Estonia and the Czech 
Republic but accelerated in Latvia and Lithuania, reflecting a delayed 
employment impact of the economic slowdown in 1999, and also in 
Bulgaria. Overall, in the 10 countries covered by figure n. 13 employment 
fell by 1,4% in 2000, and with continuing economic recovery should slow 
only a small further decline in 2001 in most countries, and stabilise during 
2002 (European Commission, 2001b, 93). 
 
 
Figure   13 - Changes in Employment  in Central and Eastern Europe 1998 
– 2000 (% change) 
 
 
 
  
Unemployment was one of the most serious negative factors. Mounting  
unemployment has invited a rash of prescriptions from Poland’s political 
parties. So far, the government of Jerzy Buzek has announced some 
palliative job creating measures, including measures to promote 
investment and ease restrictions on hiring and firing staff. 
 
The rise in unemployment in most countries that began in 1999 continued  
in 2000 - the largest increases were seen in Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria. 
These three countries, along with the Baltic countries where 
unemployment also rose in 2000, now have an unemployment rate of 
14% or more. The remaining countries (Hungary, Romania, Slovenia and 
the Czech Republic) have unemployment closer to the EU average 
(European Commission, 2001b, 94). The Czech experience  had a 
positive impact on the other CEECs countries. In fact, one of the most 
notable achievements during the Czech economic transformation has 
been a low level of unemployment. The reasons for this consist of the 
development of a market economy creating thousands of jobs, 
especially with the expansion of tourism and services. Labour was and 
remains, cheap and there are stringent rules on claiming unemployment 
benefits.  
  
 
 
Figure n. 14 - Unemployment Rates in the CEECs 1998 – 2000 (% of labour 
force) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 shows the changes in the labour force. It grew in number of 
countries in 2000, with the largest increases in Slovenia and Slovakia. 
Elsewhere, notably in Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania, employment decline 
was accompanied by reductions in the size of the labour force.  
 
 
Figure 15 - Labour Force Change 1999 and 2000 in the CEECs (% change) 
 
 
 
 
In contrast to the EU pattern where unemployment is typically higher for 
women than for men, most of the CEECs had higher male 
unemployment in 2000. The male/female gap was greatest in the Baltic 
countries. Only in Poland and the Czech Republic was male 
unemployment  significantly lower than the female rate (European 
Commission, 2001b, 93). 
 
It should be noted that comparisons between the CEECS and the EU are 
heavily affected by trends in one country- Romania. Labour market in 
developments in Romania have been unique in recent years. Decline in 
urban employment there has been reflected in a massive job growth in 
agriculture (much of it a subsistence nature) rather than in declining 
activity or rising unemployment. Reported employment and activity rates 
therefore, remain much higher than in the other CEECs, with the reported 
unemployment rate remaining relatively low. Given Romania’s relative 
size- accounting for over 20% of the population of the 10 CEECs – this has 
a substantial effect on the labour – market aggregates for the CEECs, at 
57% and 66% respectively, are  now significantly below the EU average, 
while unemployment in these countries stood   at 14% in 2000 compared 
with less than 9% in the EU. Raising the employment   rate to the level 
reached in the EU in 2000 would require raising employment by 7%, 
representing 3 million additional jobs. In response to this challenge, the 
CEECs are already moving towards adopting a strategic approach to 
employment policy in line with Member States’ practice under the EU’s 
European Employment Strategy. As part of this process, national 
authorities in the CEECs together with the Commission, are engaged in 
the drafting of a series of Joint Assessments of Employment Policy (JAPs). 
These are designed to help identify policy priorities for human resources 
development and labour market programmes and institutions. A number 
of JAPs have already been completed and published, and the rest will 
be finished by the end of 2001 (European Commission, 2001b, 94)  
 
The CEECs would require a rise in employment of 7% to match the EU’s 
employment rate in 2000- and convergence with Western European 
rates will become harder as the EU progresses towards its own ambitious 
targets. (European Commission, 2001b, 93). 
 
In the medium-term, these countries still face significant employment 
challenges. Employment and activity rates have fallen below the EU 
average and unemployment is substantially above it. Further re-
structuring is to be expected in agriculture and parts of the industrial 
sector, so that overall employment growth will be heavily dependant on 
trends in the services sector- particularly financial, business and personal 
services. In addressing these problems, the CEECs are moving to align 
their employment policies with existing EU practice (European 
Commission, 2001b, 93) 
  
Trade unionism is another important issue. All the ex-communist countries 
were characterized by a weak trade  union representation. Usually there 
was only one trade union which implemented the governmental policy. 
As a result there was no room for collective bargaining. With the collapse 
of communism and the progressive development of democracy  the first 
alternative trade unions appeared and the government gave up a lot of 
its positions in favour of the social partners. In spite of all this the reformed 
former communist unions and those that have been set up more recently 
face an uphill struggle to win credibility with employers and workers in an 
uncertain economic climate.  
 
 
There are a lot of different opinions about the future of trade unions in 
the CEECs. In the long run, some experts would like to see Czech 
industrial relations structured along the lines of a German Works Council 
in companies and union representation on company boards. Others, 
such as Mr. Drzerwicki of Poland’s Solidarity Party, suggest the French 
model – with a low union presence in factories and offices but strong 
labour laws and an influential voice for labour at the national level- is a 
more realistic long-term  possibility. But just as trade unionism in Asia has 
not followed the practice in Europe or America, so in Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union a new  model may emerge. Despite the tough 
times the unions are going through, one thing seems certain: they are 
here to stay. The climbing jobless rate, discriminatory labour standards, 
and other internal problems can be a serious obstacle for the countries 
wishing to join the EU. As Bruno Dethomas, the EU’s Warsaw ambassador 
stated “It will be harder to convince people in Germany and Austria to 
allow free labour movement with unemployment this high”. The 
applicant countries should bring their conditions into line with EU rules (M. 
Ladò, 2002).  
 
Russian’s situation is different from the situation in other countries of the 
former communist block, most of which are now candidate countries for 
joining the EU. This fact can be explained by some reasons. Firstly, 
historically Russia suffered more from the communist regime than its 
counterparts. Secondly, the recent disintegration of the gigantic empire 
brought a lot of problems into light of a political, social, economic and 
also legal character. One of the serious problems is that of  delimitation 
of objects of jurisdiction and authorities between the bodies of state 
power of the Russian Federation and the bodies of state power of the 
subjects of the Russian Federation in the sphere of labour law (S. Mavrin, 
2001). As notes Prof. S. Ivanov, in terms of a relatively low legal culture in 
Russia  ‘…the model of joint competence is rather vague and 
inadequate. In practice this model has already caused discontent and 
creates difficulties in the legal regulation of labour since according to 
the Constitution, republics, regions, areas, and even some cities may 
adopt laws and various regulations’ (S. Ivanov, 1996, 133). One of the 
peculiarities of labour law in Russia is that Russian labour legislation is 
organised as a completely independent, autonomous and to some 
extent, self-sufficient branch of law (S. Mavrin, 2001). This particular 
characteristic unites the post- communist countries. This means that 
formally all individual labour relations between any employee and 
employer are governed by the rules of labour law. But the problem is 
that the code of Labour Law of RF was adopted as early as in 1971 (9 
December) ‘under the conditions of complete domination of 
administrative and command methods of economy’. So, it doesn’t 
correspond any more to the present economic and social situation. 
Nowadays, in terms of the open market economy and mounting 
competitiveness the labour market needs more flexible models otherwise 
it shifts towards forms of illegal employment thus contributing to the 
development of the underground economy. The negative impact of the 
old Labour Code consists of fact that legally “overprotected” workers 
really are in a very  nasty situation since the employers do not want to be 
bound by the rigid terms of labour contracts. So an employee in order to 
get a  job in hopes of better salary voluntarily refuses great part of his 
rights and social guarantees being at a complete power of the 
employer. It is a vicious circle as another negative economic 
consequence of this is that, accordingly, the  ammount of money that 
the employer should pay to social funds are drastically reduced (S. 
Mavrin, 2001).  
 
Although the overall economic and social situation is still very difficult 
and a major part of the population lives under the threshold of poverty 
due to the fact that the wages do not correspond to the minimal living 
standards. In 1999-2001 a certain revival has been observed. In 2000 the 
minimal living standard was increased by 15%, without corresponding 
wage increases.  Due to some governmental measures  the percent of 
such persons has slightly decreased from in the beginning of  41,2%  at 
the beginning of 2000, to 31,8% by the year’s end. Also the number of 
unemployed persons has been reduced. In S. Petersburg (a city with a 
relatively good economy) in 1998 unemployed persons presented 14,4% 
of the economically active population (ILO data). Regular workers 
employed in the only one job with the salary under the minimal living 
minimal wage levels was 20,8%. By the end of December 2000 these 
indexes decreased accordingly to 7,8% and 10,8%. But until  now the 
number of employed persons (also full-timers) who suffer the low wages is 
higher than the number of unemployed. (http://www. chelt.ru).  
 
In 1994 according to the Federal Department of Employment data from 
an able-bodied population of slightly more than 70 million, only 5 million 
were fully employed (S. Ivanov, 1996, 135). Women represents about 70% 
of unemployed persons. In spite the fact that some important steps have 
been done in order to lessen unemployment, in particular, in 1991 (19 
April) a Law on employment of Russia’s population which mandates that 
the state guarantee citizens’ rights to full, productive, and freely chosen 
employment (art. 5) with amendments  and agenda introduced by the 
legislation passed on 15 July 1992 creates a lot disincentives to 
unemployment as it only offers “modest” unemployment benefits to 
unemployed persons (in terms of low salaries and an employer tendency 
to diminish the real salaries of employees to reduce tax burdens).  
According to the present labour code an unemployed person  is entitled 
to 45%-75% of their average annual salary for a period of 12 months. In 
case of collective dismissals (Artt. 33/1 and 40/3 of the Labour Code) 
employees are entitled to receive a dismissal benefit which amounts to 
their monthly salary  for  a period of searching a new work. But as the 
experience of other countries testify it is not sufficient to grant employees 
material benefits only. It is necessary to pay more attention to vocational 
training, retraining and possibilities for life-long learning. These needs  
unfortunately didn’t yet receive an adequate response in the labour 
legislation (but for a recent proposal of a labour code see: S. Mavrin, 
‘2001). 
 
Another important issue related to the quality of industrial relations is the 
right to bargain collectively and the right to strike. In communist states, 
the possibility of collective bargaining didn’t exist since the government 
was the sole legislator.  The Russian Federation  law of 11 March 1992 
greatly contributed to enhancing the role of collective bargaining. As 
Ivanov stresses ‘though the above-mentioned law opens vast vistas in 
collective bargaining, in practice new collective agreements remind 
one of their predecessors, Soviet-era contracts’ (S. Ivanov, 1996, 135). For 
example the General Agreement between the All-Russia Trade Union 
Associations, All-Russia Employer’s Association, and the Government of  
the RF remained a mere declaration and didn’t contribute to the 
improvement of living conditions of Russian people. So, collective 
bargaining as they represent a very important element of the healthy 
system of industrial relations  and market economy need to be given 
more attention.  The recognition of the employees’ right to strike and 
implementing the procedure of settling collective labour conflicts are 
among the most important achievements of labour law in recent time. 
The Constitution of 1993 recognises this right as a human right. The right 
to strike had appeared long before the adoption of the Constitution, as it 
had made an appearence in the 1989 law regarding the settlement of 
collective labour conflicts and strikes. During the Soviet era the strikes 
were usually brutally suppressed as the government saw them as political 
contest. So, in Russia strikes are not a common event. Then the courts 
tend as a rule to outlaw the strikes. According to the Law of 11 March 
1992  striking is an extreme method of settling the conflict and can not 
be used until all the other  alternatives have been tried (S. Mavrin, 2001). 
 
So, the necessity for reform of labour legislation became more than 
evident. The work is being carried on and after the long debates the final 
draft of the new labour code was given for further approval to the 
Council of Federation. The tendency of Russia to harmonise its legislation 
with the standards of other countries, to modernise its laws is confirmed 
by the fact that Russia has transposed a great deal of international 
labour acts that under the RF Constitution have a priority over national 
legislation. The penetration of international legal rules into Russian labour 
legislation occurs in two main ways: by ratifying conventions and other 
acts of international organisations of which the RF is a member like 
Council of Europe and so on) and by concluding bilateral international 
agreements with other states (an example of multilateral agreements is  
the agreement made by CIS Member State Governments regarding 
cooperation in the sphere of migration and social protection of migrant 
workers in 1995 At the present time Russia has ratified 56 ILO conventions, 
and among them 49 are in force. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.  The ‘Quality Factor’ in EU Industrial Relations: Conclusive  
Remarks  
  
 
¾ Following the main results of our literature review it seems to be 
highly advisable first of all to develop a monitoring system on 
the way in which directives in social as well as employment 
affairs are actually transposed and implemented at the 
domestic level.  
 
The open method coordination (OPC) should be extended to the 
activity of the social parties when engaging in the transposition process, 
as provided by the Treaty. Industrial relations in this context play what 
can be considered a quasi public role, in that the traditional 
Government intervention is replaced by the activity of social parties. 
Since this is not simply a bargaining process, belonging exclusively to 
their private autonomy, social parties should be subject to a monitoring 
process to avoid that, along with the transposition process, competition 
distortions, that the directive seeks to remove, are actually reproduced 
nationally. 
 
At the moment it also seems that this monitoring function might be 
exercised by the Commission which may eventually start infringement 
proceedings. Nevertheless, this remedy is certainly limited to special 
circumstances where the violation of Community law is to some extent 
remarkable (e.g. lack of transposition by a Member state). No 
mechanism is currently available to ensure the quality of the transposition 
process, supposedly aimed at guaranteeing the quality of employment, 
rather than simply its creation.  
 
¾ Social parties, at various levels, should be involved in this process 
of coordinating the transposition of social directives, as well as in 
the strategy of modernization of work organization.  
 
The transferability of OPC to social affairs seems to be 
recommendable on the basis of the limited action taken by social 
parties in implementing Pillar 3 of the EES, considered to be of primary, 
if not exclusive responsibility of Governments. The “process within the 
process”, as presently regulated in Pillar 3 of the Luxembourg process, 
proved to be unable to produce desirable outcomes.  
 
The Lisbon Summit Conclusions have encouraged for the adoption of 
OPC not so much to define a general ranking of Member States in each 
policy but rather to organise a learning process at the European level in 
order to stimulate exchange and the emulation of best practices, in 
order to help Member States to improve their own national policies.  OPC 
is more than a simple benchmarking, since it strengthens management 
by objectives by adapting guidelines to national diversity. OPC makes a 
clear distinction between reference indicators to be adopted at 
European level and concrete targets to be set up by each Member 
state for each indicator, taking into account their starting point (see M.J. 
Rodrigues, 2001).  
 
The duty of management and labour to report annually to the Council 
on the outcome of their action in modernising labour law and industrial 
relations, as started by the Lisbon Council and translated into the 2001 
EGLs, seems to be a good step in the right direction. This obligation 
possibly paves the way for a connection between social dialogue and 
OPC, although a more solid institutional framework seems to be 
indispensable. On the grounds of the multi-annual experience of the 
Luxembourg process, the risk is there that social parties take no action in 
this respect, the danger confirmed by the Stockholm summit. In this light, 
amendments of the Treaty in the context of the 2004 Intergovernmental 
Conference would be desirable.  
 
A further reason supporting the transferability of OPC methodology to 
social affairs, similarly to employment matters and, more recently, to 
social protection, is based on the rather limited effect of social parties in 
addressing the topic of work modernization at Community scale, Real 
innovative arrangements should be done at the domestic level, in 
conformity with national practices. The speed of social parties in making 
innovative deals to meet the needs of a knowledge-based economy is 
not adequate and representatives of national social parties should be 
involved in this new Committee (possibly called “Employment Relations 
Committee” or otherwise “Social Dialogue Committee”), made up only 
of representatives of management and labour, at domestic level, plus 
obviously representatives of major Community-scale actors.  
 
¾ Once a year, a report should be jointly drafted by the 
Commission, major social actors at Community level and the 
Council, according to a process similar to that of the 
Employment Title. In this way social parties would not simply 
perform as actors, but they would also bear the responsibility of 
assessing the achievements of their affiliated national 
organisations over the past 12 months.  
 
¾ The OPC should in other words become a new way of making 
regulations by the social parties, in addition to traditional 
techniques basically linked with collective bargaining and in 
any case with social dialogue. Rather than framework-
agreement, according to the present experience of the 
Treaty’s Social Chapter, we might have more frequently 
‘guidelines’, a kind of ‘soft deals’, following the recent 
experience of telework in the telecommunication sector. All in 
all, recent developments in the dialogue between UNICE and 
ETUC on the same subject demonstrate that this perspective 
may be viable.  
 
EU enlargement offers further reasons to recommend amendments to 
the present Social Chapter of the Treaty. It seems very unlikely that 
candidate countries will be able to adapt to present Member States, as 
least at the speed necessary to take advantage of the opportunities of a 
knowledge-based economy. Instead of directives and/or framework 
agreements, ‘soft deals’, under a logic of coordination managed by the 
social parties themselves, would probably fit better and speed up the 
evolution of industrial relations systems of candidate countries. EU 
enlargement requires institutional innovations in social affairs.  
 
Planning to create not simply more but also better jobs implies, as 
already stated, the consideration of quality in employment a priority. As 
anticipated above (see § 2), some criteria may be identified for that 
purpose. However, the mandate of the Lisbon summit, confirmed in Nice 
and Stockholm, to be appropriately implemented, requires an 
appropriate institutional forum, which can not be identified with the 
Employment Committee only, since it is made up exclusively of 
representatives of member States.  
 
¾ An assessment of quality should be preferably made by the 
new Committee which would gradually identify appropriate 
criteria and/or indicators. Quality in employment and social 
affairs can not be seen as an instant creation, but rather a 
gradual process to be stimulated by a logic of coordination.  
 
Conclusively, it seems appropriate to recommend the establishment of a 
special Committee empowered to implement the OPC methodology 
also in social affairs, including labour law and industrial relations. The 
Committee should be set up via a council decision (politically agreed at 
the Barcelona European Council in march 2002) and later on openly laid 
down by a revised Social Policy Chapter of the Treaty, providing for the 
extension of the OPC to social affairs. Special guidelines should be made 
on a yearly basis by the Council, on recommendation of the Commission 
after extensive consultation with social parties at Community level. In this 
way legal obstacles for developing quality in labour law and industrial 
relations could be gradually removed. 
 
Needless to say that such an innovation would be much favoured by a 
wide agreement between major social actors at the Community level, 
somehow imitating the experience of the birth of the Social Chapter at 
Maastricht. The meeting between social parties and the Troika at the eve 
of the Barcelona summit might represent good timing to launch such an 
innovative project.  
 
In the case of the above mentioned recommendations that are not 
deemed to be viable, it might be at least advisable to build on the 
Stockholm Conclusions which have endorsed the ‘setting up as soon as 
possible of the European Observatory for Industrial Change” as part of 
the Dublin Foundation. The main mission of the ‘Observatory’ should be 
that of drafting an annual report in order to monitor the activity of social 
parties in dealing with the EES Adaptability Pillar. In other words the 
‘Observatory’ might stimulate the voluntary adoption by the social 
parties of the OPC methodology, to be supervised by the Employment 
Committee within the Luxembourg process.  
 
Box 9 – Main Conclusions 
 
 
1. An open method of coordination (OMC) should be envisaged for 
the European social partners to be implemented by the European 
social partners. The European social partners should experiment 
with their own process. 
 
2. However, the OMC would have a different meaning for industrial 
relations than for Member States. OMC for governments are based 
on common purposes and peer review for the achievement of 
such common purposes. Instead, social partners have diverse 
purposes and must find a sufficiently interesting trade off for both 
parties. 
 
3. Social partners need an incentive to participate and to commit 
themselves to an OMC. Social partners are autonomous 
organisations, where affiliation is voluntary. Thus, social partners 
must be able to show their members what this process has for 
them. 
 
4. The extension of OMC to industrial relations should contribute to 
identify a beneficial interplay between the different levels so that 
interesting trade offs can be established and then extended at the 
appropriate level. Accordingly, the European level can have a 
decisive importance to identify strategic trade offs at the EU level, 
which can then have a positive impact at national level.  
 
5. It is necessary to make a clear distinction between the bipartite 
and tripartite processes. Then it will be necessary to see the 
interactions of the different levels. 
 
6. Different trends can be identified in industrial relations across 
Europe: decentralisation and centralisation. Successful 
decentralisation will require a good and well managed 
centralisation. Decentralisation at company level can impose 
higher transaction costs and competition imbalances. A well 
managed centralisation, including at EU level, can have a positive 
impact on the new game relationship between different levels 
and can also facilitate a learning process based on the exchange 
of good practice (European added value).  
 
7. In any case, it remains very important to improve the social 
partners’ participation to the different processes, in particular to 
the Luxembourg process. So far the process has been unevenly 
implemented, and social partners are not equally involved in all 
Member States.  
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